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The Virginia War Office was a critical component of the Virginia government 
during the American Revolution. Its duties encompassed every aspect of planning, 
," 
supplying, and waging war in the state. The Commissioner of War gathered strategic 
information, superintended the state's military factories, and provided continuity between 
the administrations of Governors Jefferson, Nelson and Harrison. The ability of the War 
Office to execute its duties depended largely on the diligence of the Commissioner of 
War and his ability to cope with problems beyond his control. Unfortunately, the trials 
and tribulations of the War Office have been overlooked by historians focusing on the 
luminary figures involved in Virginia's Revolutionary War efforts. This thesis examines 
the effectiveness of the Virginia War Office. It faced many problems that were beyond 
its control, including Virginia's economy, the constant invasions by the British, the 
autonomy of local officials, and the interference of the Continental Army. Analyzing the 
obstacles the War Office faced in the performance of its duties highlights its impact on 
the Revolutionary War in Virginia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the American Revolution in Virginia has fascinated historians since 
the birth of our nation. Scholars have written at length on the major events and the roles 
of the founding fathers in shaping them. Virginia was fortunate to have such leaders as 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry and many others call her home. 
Historians justly have focused on these men and their actions. However, these luminary 
figures did not act alone. They had the help of the people and their subordinates in the 
army and the government as well. In the biographies and narratives on the Revolutionary 
War period, these subordinates are often given a paragraph or a footnote for their 
contributions, despite playing a valuable, yet behind the scenes, role in the shaping of our 
nation. This was certainly the case with the Virginia War Office. 
The Virginia War Office labored under three governors during the war and was 
critical in its conduct, yet historians have written relatively little about it despite the large 
number of historical records it produced. In fact, entire books about the Revolutionary 
War in Virginia have been written in which the Virginia War Office and its 
Commissioners are barely mentioned. For example, in John Selby's The Revolution in 
Virginia 1775-1783 the War Office and its Commissioners are referred to only nine 
times. This is not to say the War Office was unimportant, but rather reflects on the use of 
the records by historians. Selby used the documents of the first Commissioner of the War 
Office, George Muter, to indict Thomas Jefferson's tenure as Governor of Virginia: 
"Worst of all, [John] Brown and another key bureaucrat Commissioner of War George 
Muter, were simply incompetent. Their continuance in office seriously reflects 
Jefferson's capacity as an administrator."1 It is clear from this statement that Selby views 
the post of the Commissioner of War as "key," but he never explains why. Selby further 
suggests the importance of the War Office when writing about the expansion of executive 
power by the Virginia Assembly during Thomas Nelson's term as Governor of the 
Commonwealth: "In addition, the assembly granted the commissioner of war powers 
over other agencies of government that for practical purposes rendered him a prime 
minister of war."2 Selby insinuates that the War Office became the second most 
powerful post in the Commonwealth, yet he declines to provide any further analysis. 
While Selby's book offers a great political and military narrative of the war in Virginia, it 
contains little analysis of the War Office, and only alludes to its importance. 
Emory G. Evans, the biographer of Thomas Nelson, also danced around the 
subject of the Virginia War Office. He, at least, offers some explanation as to the general 
purpose of the War Office: 
The problem of supply was even more difficult. Responsibility for coordinating 
and carrying out the supply function was in the hands of the War Office. All 
State Quartermasters and Commissaries, as well as the State Clothier and the 
Commercial Agent, reported to that office. Fortunately its direction was in the 
competent hands of William Davies .... 3
Evans partially explained the function of the War Office, and offered his opinion 
on the conduct of William Davies, the second Commissioner of War. Evans, however, 
takes the subject no further than stating tliat "Nelson was fortunate to have William 
Davies as Commissioner of the War Office" because Davies carried out his duties "with 
1 John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia 1775-1783 (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg 
Foundation, 1988), 263. 
2 Selby, Revolution, 284. 
3 Emory G. Evans, Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian (Williamsburg: The 
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1975), 107. 
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admirable efficiency."4 Jefferson biographer, Dumas Malone, barely acknowledges the 
War Office in his treatment of Jefferson's time as governor. He refers to both 
Commissioners of War once and suggests that Jefferson's poor showing as governor had 
more to do with the failure of government agencies than Jefferson's leadership.5
Unfortunately, Malone omits which government agencies in particular are to blame. He, 
like many other biographers of Jefferson, chooses to bypass an examination of the 
Virginia government agencies and instead focuses on Jefferson's leadership. The truth of 
the matter is that most historians who mention the Virginia War Office and its 
commissioners do so only in passing. Most of their comments center on the personalities 
of the commissioners and not the War Office's role. 
Other than John Selby, only a handful of historians have offered an opinion on the 
significance of the War Office and its Commissioners. A prime example is found in 
Harry Ward's and Harold Greer's book, Richmond during the Revolution 1775-1783: 
The most important office of the revised war administration was that of 
Commissioner of War. George Muter proved inefficient and Col. William Davies 
replaced him on March 22, 1781. Davies, the son of the Great Awakening 
Divine, Samuel Davies, was a superb administrator and perhaps the ablest man in 
the Virginia government. As Virginia's Commissioner of War, he directed all 
facets of the war effort. 6
Again, authors allude to the importance of the War Office, yet they do not deliver 
any more substantial analysis of the subject. Ward and Greer quickly summarize the 
4 Emory G. Evans, "Executive Leadership in Virginia 1776-1781: Henry, Jefferson and Nelson," 
in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. by Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1981), 220-221. 
5 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), vol. I, 
Jefferson the Virginian, 368. 
6 Harry M. Ward and Harold E. Greer, Richmond During the Revolution 1775-1783 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 94. 
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duties of the War Office and lavish praise on Davies without giving any indication as to 
how they formulated their conclusion. They are not alone in praising the War Office and 
Colonel William Davies in particular. John McBride's dissertation, "The Virginia War 
Effort: 1775-1783: Man Power Policies and Practices," goes even farther than Ward and 
Greer. He provides the strongest statement in favor of the War Office of any historian 
that has touched on the subject: 
One can argue that only the fact that William Davies was an excellent 
administrator who was willing to assume responsibility that properly belonged to 
the Governor enabled the state to retain a modicum of control over its military 
affairs. Davies took charge of the War Office about 3 months before Jefferson 
left office, provided the essential continuity between two administrations and 
perhaps deserves much of the credit which is generally given to Nelson, 
particularly with respect to the collection of supplies and provisions. 7
McBride's powerful statement leaves us wanting for more information on the 
Virginia War Office. His topic is sufficiently narrowed to include only a small part of the 
War Office's duties and therefore he only offers a few brief comments on the office. 
These comments, however, leave an impression of the importance of the War Office. It 
is clear that McBride has utilized records related to the Virginia War Office in his 
analysis of Virginia's militia laws and their application. Otherwise, he would not be able 
to make such a bold statement about the Commissioner of War. Unfortunately, McBride 
did not devote more time and space in his study to expand on the role and importance of 
the Virginia War Office. In fact, no detailed study of the Virginia War Office exists even 
though extensive records were left behind by that office. 
While secondary sources specific to the Virginia War Office are virtually 
nonexistent, there are extensive primary sources directly related to it. The Library of 
7 John David McBride, "The Virginia War Effort: 1775-1783: Man Power Policies and Practices," 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1977), 328-329. 
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Virginia is the natural launching point for any study involving Virginia history and its 
collections hold many primary sources related to the Virginia War Office. The 
correspondence of the civilian and military leaders during the American Revolution 
contain many letters from and to the Commissioners of War. The Governors of Virginia, 
in particular, were in constant contact with their primary military advisor during the war. 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Julian P. Boyd, contains hundreds ofletters 
between Governor Jefferson and both Commissioners of War. Governors Thomas 
Nelson and Benjamin Harrison also had extensive communication with the Virginia War 
Office as illustrated in the third volume of the Official Letters of the Governors of the 
State of Virginia, edited by H.R. Mcilwaine. Most of these letters come in the form of 
instructions to the War Office or in response to questions posed by its Commissioners. 
The Governors were not the only high ranking officials to exchange letters with 
the Virginia War Office. The Continental Officers serving in the Southern War 
Department also produced a large amount of correspondence with the War Office. The 
Papers of General Nathanael Greene, edited by Richard Showman and Dennis Conrad, 
contain many communications with the Virginia Government and the War Office in 
particular. General Greene, the commander of the Southern War Department, constantly 
dealt with the Virginia government and Colonel William Davies, in particular. When 
Greene left for the Carolinas to assume control of the Continental forces there, he left 
General Baron von Steuben in Virginia. The Baron's correspondence, collected by the 
New York Historical Society and edited by Edith von Zemensky, is overflowing with 
letters addressing every aspect of the war in Virginia. The Baron worked very closely 
with the War Office and its commissioner William Davies. As a result of Lord 
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Cornwallis's invasion and eventual entrapment at Yorktown, letters to and from the War 
Office can be found in the correspondence of General Marquis de Lafayette and General 
George Washington. The list of officers and minor state officials who dealt with the War 
Office is too numerous to cite, but suffice it to say that the Library of Virginia has all of 
these records and more. Luckily, one does not have to rely exclusively on the papers of 
other notable historic figures to piece together a record of the Virginia War Office. 
As a state agency, the Virginia War Office produced its own records which are 
collected at the Library of Virginia. Most of these records can easily be accessed by 
microfilm and provide volumes of information on the daily operation of the War Office. 
The most important of these primary sources are the War Office Records, which contain 
the War Office Letter Books and the Executive War Office Letter Book. These books 
include copies of the letters sent by and received in the War Office for the years of 1780 
to 1782. These collections ofletters provide a unique look into the daily conduct of the 
war in Virginia and the operation of the War Office in particular. There is also the 
Virginia War Office Letter Book 1779-1781 which contains a fragmented look at the 
daily operations of the War Office. It features an incomplete record, largely because of 
the loss of most of the records during to Benedict Arnold's sacking of Richmond and the 
Westham foundry in 1781. The bulk of this primary resource deals with the aftermath of 
Arnold's invasion and the subsequent removal of the first Commissioner of War. 
Another primary resource, the Journal of the War Office, includes daily entries of the 
business of the War Office. The minutes of the journal help fill in some gaps in the War 
Office Letter Books. There are other unpublished manuscript collections relating to the 
War Office in the Library of Virginia, such as the records of other agencies like the 
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Public Store and Commercial Agent. Many other documents relating to the War Office 
can also be found in the Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts edited 
by William Palmer. There is an abundance of primary source material on the War Office 
that can be easily accessed and has been used by many historians on other projects. With 
this plethora of information, it is unclear why no one has attempted a more in-depth study 
of the Virginia War Office. 
This thesis will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Virginia War Office 
during the American Revolution. A study of the War Office must start with its origin 
and, therefore, with the legislation that created it. This thesis will explore the reasons for 
the creation of the War Office and its legislative evolution into one of the most powerful 
agencies in the Commonwealth of Virginia. It will also discuss the War Office's 
legislative demise near the end of the war as the Virginia General Assembly began to 
shrink the government in cost-saving measures. 
The second part of this thesis will examine the lives of the men who worked in the 
Virginia War Office. The personalities and qualifications of the two Commissioners of 
War are directly related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the office. No study of the 
War Office would be complete without examining the backgrounds of Colonel George 
Muter and Colonel William Davies. Their life experiences helped to formulate the type 
of Commissioner each man turned out to be, while the circumstances of war dictated how 
they were judged by their peers and history. 
The third chapter of this thesis will discuss the difficulties facing the War Office 
in the performance of its duties. Many factors affected the ability of the Commissioner of 
War to carry out his actual duties; most of these factors were completely beyond his 
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control. The circumstances of war often dictated what options the War Office had and 
what it could do. Virginia was the warehouse for the Continental Army in the South, and 
the constant invasions by the British certainly hampered that role. The War Office faced 
many obstacles, not the least of which was the beleaguered finances of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. Military failures and defeats in the Carolinas also weighed 
heavily on the War Office's planning and recruitment of soldiers. Unfortunately, it 
seems the War Office had to plan and fight the war against friend and foe. Virginia's 
own local officials were often at odds with the state government and worked contrary to 
the wishes of the War Office. The Continental Army also frustrated the War Office's 
plans with its regulations and practices. The Continentals in Virginia frequently crippled 
the ability of the War Office to carry out its primary function of supply by competing for 
the same resources. Finally, by examining the difficulties the War Office faced in 
executing its duties, we can judge its impact on the Revolutionary War. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
CREATION OF THE VIRGINIA WAR OFFICE 
On June 1, 1779, during the midst of the Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson 
was elected as the second Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The situation 
facing Jefferson and Virginia was grim indeed. Since 1776, Virginia had supported the 
Continental war effort with troops and military supplies while the fighting took place 
elsewhere. The war had left the state with an exhausted treasury, rapidly depreciating 
currency, heavy taxes and a dwindling military establishment. 1 In addition, Virginia was 
just recovering from the shock of an incursion into the state by the British in May 1779. 
Major General Edward Mathew's 1,800 men, with the support of Commodore Sir George 
Collier's naval squadron, had descended on Portsmouth and Suffolk in the last weeks of 
Governor Patrick Henry's term and demonstrated how vulnerable Virginia was to 
invasion by burning Suffolk and capturing over 130 vessels before departing. 2 This proof 
that the war had shifted toward the South forced Jefferson to realize he had to plan to 
defend Virginia while continuing to support the Southern Department of the Continental 
Army with troops and supplies. 
Jefferson, realizing that his gubernatorial duties were too much for one man alone 
to carry out, began the process of overhauling the Virginia government. At his urging, 
the Assembly passed legislation in the May 1779 session creating a number of advisory 
1 Marie Kimball, Jefferson: War and Peace 1776-1784 (New York: Coward-McCann, 1947), 51. 
2 John Selby, A Chronology of Virginia and the War oflndependence 1763-1783 (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1973), 36. 
boards to aid the Governor and Executive Council.3 Because Virginia's war effort was 
far too encompassing for Jefferson and the Council to manage effectively without 
neglecting their other duties, the General Assembly passed "An Act Establishing a Board 
of War" which created a board of five men "to superintend and manage, subject to the 
direction and control of the Governor with the advice of the council, all matters and 
things within the department of war, and all persons holding offices or performing duties 
within that department." The act also assigned specific duties to the Board of War, such 
as supervising the Commissioner of the Navy and appointing a Commissary of Prisoners, 
as well as visiting every magazine in the state and reporting its condition.4 The intention 
of this act clearly was to relieve the Governor and Executive Council ofroutine military 
administrative duties and to provide a source of knowledgeable advice on technical 
military matters.5 However, the Board of War quickly proved to be inefficient for the 
needs of the state and in aiding Governor Jefferson. It failed to relieve the Executive of 
routine military matters because every plan or order had to be submitted to the Governor 
and Executive Council for approval before taking affect.6 For example, on January 21, 
1780, the Board of War wrote Jefferson alerting him that the state artillery officers were 
requesting boots. Jefferson countersigned the letter and added that the Board should 
provide the boots at their discretion.7 Essentially, the Board of War became a 
3 Selby, Revolution, 239. 
4 William Waller Hening, comp. , The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of 
Virginia From the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1969), 10:17-18. 
5 McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 146-47. 
6 Hening, Statutes, 10:18. 
7 Board of War to Thomas Jefferson with reply, January 21, 1780, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., JP 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 3:265. 
10 
bookkeeping committee for the Governor and Executive Council, occasionally offering 
advice based on the reports received from officers in the field.8 The new Board of War 
often found it difficult to even conduct such business because it required at least three 
members to be present for a quorum. Absenteeism became such a problem that in 
October 1779, the Assembly reduced the quorum by one member in the hopes that 
business could be conducted with some regularity. This measure, however, did little to 
improve the usefulness of the Board of War. Instead, it placed most of the burden of its 
functions on James Innes, the chairman, and James Barron, formerly of the Naval Board.9
The Board of War continued to be inefficient due to its structure and lack of authority 
until April of 1780 when it disintegrated. The members of the Board of War were 
opposed to moving their offices from Williamsburg to Richmond where the capital of the 
state was being transferred. In a letter dated February 18, 1780, the Board of War 
informed Governor Jefferson that it would be impracticable to move the Board to 
Richmond in April for several reasons. It stated that the distance from seaports would 
hinder supply gathering, and that it would be too difficult and expensive for the state to 
move the Board and its related offices, such as the Commissary of Stores. The Board of 
War concluded that Jefferson's only option was to allow the Board to stay in 
Williamsburg or to abolish it entirely. 10 Governor Jefferson took advantage of the move 
to Richmond to eliminate the troublesome Board of War by simply allowing it to 
disintegrate. Both Innes and Barron performed their duties until April 7, 1780, the last 
8 Selby, Revolution, 240. 
9 Ibid., 241. 
10 Board of War to Thomas Jefferson, February 18, I 780, in JP, 3:297-98. 
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day Williamsburg was the official capital of Virginia. Governor Jefferson and the 
Council then assumed the duties of the Board ofWar.11 The Board had been a failure and 
the problem it was intended to alleviate still existed and required another remedy. 
In the May 1780 session, the General Assembly ordered that General Thomas 
Nelson Jr., Mann Page, Jr., Bolling Starke, George Lyne, James Innes and Robert Lee 
form a committee to propose a bill to repeal the act establishing the Boards of War and 
Trade and to appoint a Commissioner of the Navy, a Commissary of Military Stores, and 
a Mercantile Agent.12 On Wednesday June 14, 1780, Starke presented the bill before the 
House entitled "An Act to repeal an Act establishing a Board of War, and one other act 
establishing a Board of Trade; and appointing a Commissioner of the Navy, a 
Commissary of military stores, and a Commercial Agent." The bill was read twice before 
the House and then ordered to be committed to the Committee of the whole House on the 
next Friday. 13 This bill marks the birth of the Virginia War Office, although it was not 
specifically mentioned in the title of the act. The purpose of the bill was undoubted! y to 
relieve the Governor and Executive Council of their more menial tasks. It is interesting 
to note that the framers of the bill initially thought that only a Commissary of Military 
Stores was needed and not a Commissioner in a War Office. Perhaps, the legislators 
wished to avoid the mistakes made with the Board of War and forego the possibility of 
another body of men to bicker with the Governor and Executive Council as had happened 
with the Board of War. 
11 Selby, Revolution, 246. 
12 Journal of the House of Delegates, May 1, 1780, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm reel 331, 8. 
13 Ibid., 4 7. 
12 
The bill, however, was subjected to several amendments while being considered 
by the Committee of the whole House. During this period, the delegates realized that a 
Commissary of Military Stores, while clearly necessary, would fail to provide the 
Governor and Executive Council with the kind of aid they needed for running the war 
effort. On June 29, 1780, after three days of debate, the amendments were agreed to and 
the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time. 14 The next day, the bill was 
read for the third time and passed the House under the title of "An Act to repeal the Act 
establishing a Board of War, and one other Act establishing a Board of Trade, and for 
appointing a Commissioner of the Navy, a Commissioner of the War Office, and a 
Commercial Agent." Starke then carried the bill to the Senate for its concurrence. 15 This 
version of the bill marks the first mention of a War Office and demonstrates that the 
House clearly believed that the new office's duties would stretch far beyond those of a 
Commissary of Military Stores. The Senate returned the bill on July 4, 1780 with several 
amendments which the House assented to on July 6, 1780. The bill was then sent back 
into the Senate where it was approved and then signed by the Speaker of the Senate and 
returned to the House. "An Act to repeal an Act establishing a Board of War, and one 
other Act establishing a Board of Trade, and authorizing the Governour and Council to 
appoint a Commissioner of the Navy, a Commissioner of the War Office, and a 
Commercial Agent" was then signed by the Speaker of the House and passed into law on 
Saturday July 8, 1780. 16 The General Assembly recognized the need for a central office 
14 Ibid., 66-67. 
15 Ibid., 69. 
16 Ibid., 74-79. 
13 
to manage the many duties related to the state's war effort that the Governor and 
Executive Council were too busy to address. The new law read: 
For the purpose of introducing economy into all the various departments of the 
government, and for conducting the publick business with the greatest expedition, 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That the act entitled "An Act establishing 
a board of Trade and one other act establishing a board of War," be and the same 
hereby repealed; and it shall and may be lawful for the governor with the advice 
of council, to demand and receive from the commissioners of the Board of War 
and of the Board of Trade, all records, papers, vouchers, and other documents 
which shall belong to the commonwealth, and which have been heretofore in the 
custudy or keeping of the said boards, and upon receipt thereof, to grant all and 
every of the commissioners such full and proper acquittances or indemnifications 
for, or an account of their transactions during their continuance in office as shall 
seem just and reasonable, and to dispose of such records and papers, in such a 
manner as they shall think proper. And that the business which was heretofore 
conducted by the boards of war and trade, may be executed with the greatest 
expidition, Be it enacted, That a commercial agent, a commissioner of the navy, 
and a commissioner of the War Office, be appointed by the governour with advice 
of council. The said officers shall be under the control and direction of the 
governour and council, and discharge the several duties which shall be by 
executive adjudged to appertain to their respective offices, to whom they shall 
from time to time be amenable for their good conduct, and by whose direction 
they shall act in their several functions. 17
This act represented an improvement over the Board of War Act in many ways. 
By strengthening the ability of the Executive to manage its branch of the government, the 
General Assembly sought to alleviate the problems that the Board of War had caused. Its 
first improvement was to streamline the chain of command from an unwieldy Board to 
that of a single Commissioner. Furthermore, while the Board of War Act called for the 
General Assembly to appoint the members of the Board, the War Office Act allowed the 
Governor and Executive Council to select the individual they deemed suitable for the role 
of Commissioner. This clause was included in the legislation to ensure that the Executive 
would not be at odds with the new Commissioner. The Governor and Executive Council 
17 Hening, Statutes, 10:291-92. 
14 
could now only blame themselves if they chose a Commissioner who would spend more 
time bickering with them than running the war effort, as the Board of War had done. 18 
The War Office Act also allowed the Governor and Executive Council to assign the 
powers and duties of the Commissioner of the War office as well as the Commissioner of 
the Navy and the Commercial Agent. This fostered the division ofresponsibilities rather 
than loading them all on the back of the Commissioner of the War Office, as had been 
done with the Board of War. Under the previous act, the Board of War was responsible 
for all military or war matters and had supervisory powers over the Commissioner of the 
Navy. This meant that the Board of War was faced with the overwhelming task of 
conducting the war on land and sea. Under the new act, the Commissioner of the War 
Office had responsibility only for the land forces while the Commissioner of the Navy 
managed all of Virginia's naval matters. 
Although the new War Office Act marked an improvement over the Board of War 
Act, it still suffered from the greatest weakness of the old law. Under the Board of War 
Act all actions of the Board had to be approved by the Governor and Executive Council 
before being implemented. This provision had rendered the Board virtually powerless 
and reduced it to the role of a clerk. Unfortunately, the War Office Act retained this 
check on the autonomy of the Commissioner of the War Office. The Commissioner had 
to act under the direction of the Governor and Executive Council, which meant that he 
was required to have their approval before implementing any plans. The only difference 
between the two acts in this respect was that the Commissioner of the War Office could 
respond more promptly to instructions than the Board of War, which required a quorum 
18 McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 148. 
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to be present in order to conduct business. The General Assembly had scrapped a board 
of clerks for a single official and allowed the Governor and Executive Council to decide 
his duties and powers. Consequently, the new Commissioner of War had virtually the 
same duties and powers that the Board of War had possessed. He was to act like an 
adjutant general to the Governor and supervise all the departments in the state military 
service including the Quartermaster, Commissary General, Commissary of Military 
Stores, State Clothier General, and Commercial Agent. The new Commissioner was also 
responsible for the military public works, such as the state tannery and the state 
laboratory. The only real difference in the Commissioner's powers from those of the 
Board of War was that he did not superintend the Commissioner of the Navy. 
The law creating the Commissioner of the War Office remained unchanged until 
the May 1781 session of the General Assembly. In the time that elapsed from the 
creation of the War Office and the May 1781 session of the General Assembly, Virginia 
suffered serious setbacks in its war effort. Almost all of the Virginia Continental 
Regiments were captured at the siege of Charleston and Colonel Abraham Buford's 
detachment was destroyed at Waxhaws in May 1780. These events forced Virginia into 
recruiting and equipping more Continental Regiments, only to see them obliterated in the 
Battle of Camden in August 1780. Virginia lost two armies in the span of three months. 
To further compound these setbacks, Virginia was invaded in October 1780 by General 
Alexander Leslie, in December 1780 and January 1781 by the traitor, Benedict Arnold, 
and in April 1781 by General William Phillips. Virginia's lack of preparedness to 
repulse the British reflected seriously on the Commissioner of the War Office and his 
efforts to keep Virginia in a sound military state. When Lord Cornwallis and Benedict 
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Arnold completed a juncture of their forces in Petersburg on May 20, 1781, it became 
clear to the General Assembly that stronger legislation was needed if Virginia was to 
continue to survive as a state. So in the May 1781 session, the General Assembly began 
crafting legislation to strengthen the powers of the Governor and the Commissioner of 
the War Office. 
On June 15, 1781, the House of Delegates, meeting in Staunton, ordered Mann 
Page, Jr., Benjamin Dulaney, and William Campbell to prepare and bring in a bill to 
regulate the department of the War Office. Mann Page, Jr. presented the bill before the 
House of Delegates, which ordered it to be committed to the Committee of the whole 
House. 19 The bill to regulate the department of the War Office was debated on June 20, 
1781, and several amendments were added until it was finally ordered to be read a third 
time and engrossed. On June 21, 1781, the House of Delegates passed "An Act to 
regulate the Department of the War Office" and ordered it carried to the Senate for its 
concurrence. 20 The Senate wasted no time in considering this bill and added their own
amendments before sending it back to the House. The House, on June 22, 1781, assented 
to the Senate's amendments and the bill was signed into law on June 23, 1781.21 "An Act 
to regulate the Department of the War Office" was intended "to invest the Commissioner 
of the War Office with more ample powers, and more expressly to define his duty" and it 
did just that.22 
19 Journal of the House ofDelegates ofVirginia, May 1781 Session, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm 
reel 331, 29-32. 
20 Ibid., 39-41.
21 Ibid., 49.
22 Hening, Statutes, 10:426. 
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Whereas the act creating the War Office had left the Commissioner's duties up to 
the definition of the Governor and Executive Council, the regulatory act precisely defined 
them. The Commissioner now had the power to demand and receive returns relating to 
military affairs from all public offices, which could aid him in accurately reporting the 
state's situation to the Governor and Assembly.23 Under the previous act, it was assumed 
that the Commissioner of the War Office would gather information for the benefit of the 
Executive, but there was no law requiring the several departments to comply with the 
requests of the Commissioner of War. Because the Commissioner lacked any means of 
coercing the various department heads into complying with his requests, information 
fl 
. 
d h" 24o en was never transm1tte to 1m. 
Under the new regulatory act, the various departments within the Department of 
War were now required by law to provide timely returns to the Commissioner. The 
Quartermaster General was required to submit a return every three months which 
included all the stores in his department and exact accounts of all forage collected by his 
department. In addition, he was to report the quantity and quality of magazines with the 
types of stores he had in his care, as well as accounts of his transfers and issues to 
Continental agents. The Commissary General was required to furnish quarterly returns 
detailing what military stores were received and which counties met their quota of 
supplies. The State Clothier or Subclothier also had to make returns to the War Office of 
his receipts and issues. The Commercial Agent, the man who replaced the Board of 
Trade, was to issue quarterly returns to the War Office detailing the amount of tobacco 
23 Ibid., 10:426. 
24 George Muter, to Quartermaster General for State, December 11, 1780, WOLB, July 21, 1780-
January 2, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 72. 
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and taxes raised to purchase goods that the state's war machine needed. The Commissary 
of Military Stores was also required to file returns detailing the state of his department, its 
magazines and laboratory. He was also responsible for reporting all of his issues to and 
receipts from state and continental agents. Last but not least, the Commissioners of the 
Specific Tax and Provisions were required to send in quarterly returns of all tax-levied 
supplies collected and issued.25 The new regulatory act also made it clear that the 
Commissioner of the War Office was to act as an Adjutant General's Department for the 
state. In other words, all orders concerning the military in Virginia given by the 
Executive were to be issued from and recorded in the War Office. 
The new law did not merely direct that the Commissioner of the War Office was 
to act like an Adjutant General, but it defined some of those duties. For example, the 
Commissioner was to keep a roster for the regulation of militia duty and a register of 
militia officers with rank included. These militia officers were to submit semi-annual 
returns of the strength of their corps and the number and condition of their arms. The 
Commissioner of War was also required to keep descriptive lists of all recruits, deserters, 
and militia delinquents, as well as the proceedings of all courts martial. Lists of the 
Virginia Continental Regiments and state regiments detailing the rank of officers and 
strength of the corps were also to be kept in the War Office. The new act gave the War 
Office the power to issue all commissions to the Continental and militia officers after 
they were signed by the Governor and attested to by the Commissioner of War.26 
25 Hening, Statutes, 10:426-29. 
26 Ibid., 10:426-29.
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All the powers so far defined in "An Act to regulate the Department of the War 
Office" were designed to improve the Commissioner's ability to carry out the War 
Office's prime mission, which was to provide military information to the Executive. The 
act, however, also gave the Commissioner of the War Office expanded powers beyond 
those of simple information gathering. He was given the authority to "Superintend the 
establishment of magazines, regularity of issues, and shall in general direct and manage 
all matters and things within the department of war, as well as all persons holding offices 
or performing duties within that department."27 The General Assembly had finally given 
the Commissioner of the War Office the autonomy his position required. The regulatory 
act contained no restraining clause dictating that the Commissioner could only act under 
the direction of the Executive, as had the Board of War Act and the Act creating the War 
Office. The Commissioner of War was empowered to act independently in the 
management of Virginia's war effort. He was, however, limited by being second in 
command to the Governor and Executive Council. The Governor was the supreme 
commander of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Commissioner was still subject to 
his orders and could not countermand them on his own authority, but the War Office 
relieved the Executive of the burden of routine military matters on a daily basis. 
Through the various acts creating and modifying the Virginia War Office, one can 
see the evolution of the office and the potential it had to impact Virginia's war efforts. 
The War Office started out as a simple continuance of the Board of War with a few 
notable changes and ended up as the second most powerful office in the Virginia 
government. One historian, in referring to the Commissioner of the War Office, noted 
27 Ibid., 10:426-29. 
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that "An Act to regulate the Department of the War Office" had "for practical purposes 
rendered him a prime minister ofwar."28 
28 Selby, Revolution, 284.
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE WAR OFFICE 
The creation of the Virginia War Office and its alteration into a powerful 
component of the executive branch was certainly a legislative odyssey. The necessity of 
the office was evident to everyone, but required much trial and error to implement. The 
transformation of the Virginia War Office was driven by several factors. The 
temperament of the politicians and the fortunes of war definitely played major roles. The 
other key ingredients in the transformation, however, were the men who held the post. 
Their skills and personalities were the driving force behind the changes to the laws 
governing the office and its overall effectiveness. An examination of the War Office 
must therefore include an analysis of these men. 
During its existence two men held the post of Commissioner of the War Office. 
The first, Colonel George Muter, was officially appointed on July 17, 1780.1 Before the 
war, Colonel Muter had been a lawyer, whose practice ranging from Richmond to the 
Chesapeake Bay, had allowed him to accumulate substantial property holdings in several 
cities as well as a number of slaves.2 In January 1767, Muter advertised in the Virginia 
Gazette a Portsmouth lot with a "good storehouse, quite new, and also a negro woman, 
who is a good cook, & negro man, and large boy, both of which are used to work on ships 
and go by water." The advertisement concluded by revealing that Muter would accept 
credit until June, which suggests that he could afford to wait for payment.3 In addition to 
his Portsmouth holdings, he also owned land or resided in Richmond and Norfolk. Later 
1 George Muter to Thomas Jefferson, March 6, 1781, JP, 5:78-80. 
2 Virginia Gazette (Purdie), March 6, 1778, L V, microfilm 11, reel 6. 
in 1767, Colonel Muter advertised again in the Virginia Gazette for a runaway slave 
named Will, who could be returned to either Alexander Mccaul in Richmond or Henry 
Tucker in Norfolk, who were acting as Muter's agents in those cities.4 By 1775, Muter
was seeking to rent some of his Richmond property. In an advertisement in the Virginia 
Gazette, he listed a tenement across from Mrs. Younghusband's Tavern that could serve 
as a tavern or a house for two families. The tenement was said to be in good condition 
with a large garden and a stable for twelve horses.5 Muter had little use for the residence 
during 1775, since he was currently involved in military duty at Williamsburg. 
At some point during the latter half of 1775, Muter began his military career, 
perhaps serving in one of the many volunteer corps about Williamsburg. The earliest 
record ofMuter's service appears in the December 13, 1775, Virginia Gazette. "General 
Orders" were issued from "Headquarters, Williamsburg, November 19, 1775," in which 
all the troops quartered in the city of Williamsburg were ordered to be guarded in their 
conduct to all Americans. The "General Orders" were signed "George Muter, Sec'ry, 
C.C." and given to the paper by the Mayor of Williamsburg, who received them from
Colonel Henry.6 Muter's first military experience in the patriot cause was as a secretary
to the acting Commander in Chief of Virginia's military forces. He probably continued 
in those duties until March 16, 1776, when the Council of Safety appointed him a Captain 
in the state navy. Muter was later reappointed by Governor Henry on July 16, 1776 to 
3 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), January I, 1767, LV, microfilm 11, reel 2. 
4 Ibid., September 24, 1767. 
5 Virginia Gazette (Dixon & Hunter), November I 8, 1775, L V, microfilm 11, reel 5. 
6 Virginia Gazette (Pinkney), December 13, 1775, LV, microfilm 11, reel 5. 
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command the Hero.7 He remained in command of the Hero, a ninety-foot galley made of 
oak, with yellow pine decks, that carried two cannons and a crew of fifty, until he 
resigned in late 1777 to enter the newly-raised Virginia State Artillery Regiment. 8 Muter 
was given a new commission ranking him as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Virginia State 
Artillery dating from November 15, 1777.9 On November 21, 1777, the Virginia Gazette 
announced the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Muter and the other field officers of 
the Virginia Artillery Regiment. Upon hearing of their appointments, their former 
subordinates at Hampton fired the cannon located at Little Scotland and from the deck of 
the Hero in honor of their commanders. 10 Lieutenant Colonel Muter and the other 
officers of the Virginia State Artillery Regiment immediately set out to recruit the eleven 
companies of men they would need. However, before the State Artillery Regiment could 
be completed, Lieutenant Colonel Muter was given the assignment of recruiting a 
separate unit in the artillery, which would become known as the Virginia State Garrison 
Regiment. This assignment also promoted him to Colonel as of June 24, 1778 and 
required that he enlist eight companies of infantry to man the various posts in Virginia. 11
Muter's task was to ensure that Richmond, Portsmouth, Williamsburg, Hampton, and 
Yorktown had companies from his Garrison Regiment. He continued in these duties until 
early in 1780 when calls for aid from South Carolina prompted Virginia to send a special 
7 Robert Armistead Stewart, The History of Virginia's Navy of the Revolution (Baltimore: 
Genealogical Publishing Co. Inc., 1934), 229. 
8 E. M. Sanchez-Saavedra, comp., A Guide to Virginia Military Organizations in the American
Revolution, 1774-1787 (Richmond: Library of Virginia, 1978), 157. 
9 Ibid., 124. 
10 Virginia Gazette (Purdie), November 21, 1777, LV, microfilm 11, reel 6. 
11 Sanchez-Saavedra, Guide, 122-23. 
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detachment of state troops to the Southern Continental Army. Colonel Muter probably 
had ambitions to go southward, but Governor Jefferson and the Board of War had other 
plans. On February 18, 1780, Governor Jefferson, on the advice of the Board of War, 
wrote to Colonel Muter and ordered him to take charge of the state's river defenses and 
specifically the construction of the battery at Hood's, a key position on the James River. 
Colonel Muter's troops were to be incorporated into the detachment, now under the 
command ofMuter's subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Charles Porterfield, and militia 
were ordered to replace them at the river defenses. 12 Colonel Muter must have been 
disappointed at losing the chance to command troops in the field. Instead of going south, 
he faced the tedious but extremely vital duty of constructing the battery at Hood's and 
overseeing the state's other river defenses. 
Colonel Muter began his new duties about the same time Governor Jefferson 
decided to allow the Board of War to disintegrate. On the same day that Muter received 
his new orders, the Board of War told Jefferson that it would rather disband than move to 
Richmond. 13 By April 7, 1780, the Board of War had ceased to function and laid its 
duties into the lap of Governor Jefferson and his Council. Consequently, the Executive 
needed to fill the void left by the Board of War or be swamped with its daily business. 
Governor Jefferson and the Council alleviated their dilemma by calling on Colonel Muter 
to assume the duties of the Board of War. Colonel Muter must have seemed like the 
natural successor for the Board of War. He was a high-ranking officer, who had served 
since 1775, and was currently overseeing the main defensive installations in Virginia. In 
12Thomas Jefferson to George Muter, February 18, 1780, JP, 3:301-2. 
13 Board of War to Thomas Jefferson, February 18, 1780, Ibid., 3:297-98. 
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addition, his duties as commander of the State Garrison Regiment had given him valuable 
knowledge of the state's military complex and experience in organizing military 
departments on a statewide scale. It is not clear exactly when Governor Jefferson 
selected Colonel Muter to assume the duties of the Board of War; it was either shortly 
before or just after the House of Delegates ordered a bill be drawn up repealing the Board 
of War and replacing it with a Commissioner of the Navy and a Commissary of Military 
Stores on May 12, 1780. 14 Governor Jefferson's correspondence reveals that he 
unofficially appointed Colonel Muter to act for the Board of War before May 27, 1780, 
nearly two months before the War Office was officially created. 15 Colonel Muter's 
correspondence with the Council indicates that he may have been acting as early as 
March 28, 1780, when the Council ordered him to take steps to remove framing from 
Sydnor's and erect it at the foundry. 16 Although this job could be related to his duties as 
overseer of Virginia's river defenses, it did not involve river defenses and fell under the 
responsibility of the Quartermaster's department. It is more likely that the Board of War 
was not meeting at this time and Governor Jefferson turned to the highest ranking officer 
of state troops present, as he had done in the past, to take care of the matter. 17 By July 8, 
1780, the General Assembly had passed the act, which abolished the Board of War and 
created the post of Commissioner of the War Office. This paved the way for Colonel 
14 Journal of the House of Delegates, May 1, 1780, in VGAH J, LV, microfilm reel 331, 7-8. 
15 Thomas Jefferson to George Muter, May 27, 1780, VWOLB 1779-1781, WOR, LV, microfilm 
reel 264, 60. 
16 Thomas Jefferson, An Order in answer to Colonel Muter's letter of March 28, 1780, June 13, 
1780, Ibid., 61. 
17 H.R. Mcilwaine, ed., Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia (Richmond: LV, 1932), 
2:255. 
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Muter's official appointment as Commissioner of the War Office. Although no 
government record exists of his appointment, Colonel Muter and Governor Jefferson 
considered it official by July 17, 1780. 18 In agreeing to undertake the duties of the 
Commissioner of War, Colonel Muter insisted on certain conditions of service. He 
demanded that he retain his rank and commission in the state troops, as well as all the 
rights and emoluments associated with it. This included half pay for life and land grants 
that were due to all officers serving honorably in the state forces. Colonel Muter, in 
exchange for his demands, voluntarily agreed to give up his current pay, rations and 
forage privileges in lieu of the salary he would obtain as Commissioner of the War 
Office. 19 The exact amount of salary Colonel Muter received is unknown, but it was 
certainly less than 40,000 pounds of tobacco per annum, as that was the salary after it was 
raised by the act to regulate the War Office in May 1781. 20 As Commissioner of the War 
Office, Colonel Muter's duties were now significantly expanded from his previous ones. 
He was now the adjutant general for the Governor and had to supervise all the military 
departments in the state, as well as obtain and provide any information needed to assist 
the Governor in making command decisions. In essence, he had the powers of the Board 
of War, but without control of the Commissioner of the Navy. 
Colonel Muter began his tenure in office during an extremely difficult time for 
Virginia. The state was trying to replace its Continental troops, which had been captured 
or destroyed at Charleston and Waxhaws. Colonel Muter was presented with the 
18 George Muter to Governor Thomas Jefferson, March 6, I 78 I, WOLB January I 8, I 78 I -
September 1, 178 I, WOR, L V, microfilm reel 632, 68-70. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Henning, Statutes, 10:426-29. 
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challenge of equipping a new Continental army, while maintaining the current state 
establishment. The War Office also met a series of rapid setbacks as the year progressed. 
Soon after Virginia managed to provide troops for the Continental army, General Horatio 
Gates led them into the disastrous Battle of Camden. The loss at Camden on August 16, 
1780 meant that Virginia needed to replace yet another set of Continental troops and their 
equipment. Any progress Colonel Muter had made as Commissioner of War was 
effectively erased and before he could reestablish order in the war department, Virginia 
was invaded. 
General Alexander Leslie arrived in the Hampton area on October 20, 1780 and 
found that Virginia was unable to repel his troops. The disorganized defense of 
Virginia's ports caused the House of Delegates, on November 11, 1780, to order a 
committee to be formed "to enquire into the business of the war department, and the 
management thereof."21 Colonel Muter had only been in office for five months and his 
abilities and qualifications were already questioned. Before the results of the 
Committee's inquiry could be obtained, Virginia was invaded a second time. On 
December 30, 1780, Benedict Arnold arrived in the Chesapeake Bay with a small raiding 
force. By January 5, 1781, Arnold and his troops had marched unopposed to Richmond 
and sacked the capitol. The lack of opposition to such a small force seriously reflected 
upon the abilities of Colonel Muter as Commissioner of the War Office. Arnold's 
invasion, which will be discussed in a later chapter, demonstrates the total lack of 
preparedness of Virginia's military establishment to meet just such an invasion. As 
Commissioner of War, it was Colonel Muter's duty to ensure the readiness of Virginia's 
21 Journal ofthe House ofDelegates, October 16, 1780, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm reel 331, 21. 
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defenses for such an occasion. After Arnold went into winter quarters at Portsmouth on 
January 19, 1781, Virginians began to hunt for the persons responsible for the poor 
showing of their military against the traitor. Colonel Muter was their first and best target. 
As a result of Arnold's invasion, Colonel Muter was eventually forced to resign as 
Commissioner of the War Office. On March 2, 1781, General Baron von Steuben, the 
Continental commander of forces in Virginia, accused Colonel Muter of neglect of duty 
and laid much of the blame for Virginia's woes on him. Colonel Muter was shocked and 
outraged and responded by writing a letter to Governor Jefferson which asserted: 
Major General Baron de Steuben has this day publicly accused me of having 
neglected my duty, so as materially to injure the United States, & declared that he 
had the proofs in his possession. Though I am conscious of having, in every 
instance done my duty to the utmost of my power, yet as my character may be 
injured by such a public accusation being thrown out against me, I must request 
that your Excellency will be pleased to order such an enquiry into my conduct as 
may set it in its true light, & that you will take such measures as you think most 
proper to have the proofs the Baron alledges he has against me, produced to such 
Gentlemen as you think proper to authorize for the purpose of enquiring into my 
conduct. I must further beg of your Excellency that you will be pleased to direct 
that I may be furnished with a copy of the proofs the Baron says he has against 
me (if you think proper) as soon as may be convenient.22
It is clear by the letter that Colonel Muter believed he had served faithfully to the 
best of his ability. The letter also implies that he felt that he would be vindicated by 
asking for an inquiry into his conduct as Commissioner of War. Jefferson and the 
Executive Council responded the same day, when the Governor declared: 
The board has considered your request that they should make an enquiry into your 
conduct as Commissioner of the War Office. No complaint having been lodged 
with them on the subject, no prosecuter offering himself, no witness pointed out, 
nor even a charge specified, they do not know that they can, either with propriety 
or practicability enter on such an enquiry, the more especially as they know no 
22 George Muter to Thomas Jefferson, March 2, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781- September 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, , 49-50. 
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instances themselves, in which you may be justly charged with inattention to the 
duties of your Office.23 
This was not the answer Colonel Muter had hoped to receive. Jefferson and the 
Council had stated that they knew of no instances Colonel Muter could be charged with 
neglect, but certainly did not rush to his defense. By refusing the inquiry, Jefferson 
denied Colonel Muter any effective defense against Baron von Steuben's accusations. 
Colonel Muter was quick to realize this harsh fact and tried to remedy it by writing to the 
Baron's aide, Jonathan Walker: 
Thus, Sir, the matter at present stands, no accusation has been yet (that I know of) 
given into the Council, & I must still suffer the uneasiness arising from a severe 
accusation being thrown out against me, in harsh terms, without an opportunity of 
vindicating myself unless the Baron mentions the circumstances on which he 
founds his accusation to the Supreme Executive. My request to you is, that you 
will be so obliging as to apply to the Baron to transmit to the Supreme Executive 
as quickly as possible, the particulars of neglect of duty which he has to lay to my 
charge. This I have a right to expect he will most certainly do. Justice to the 
public, as well as to me, absolutely requires it.24
Walker, in Williamsburg, answered Colonel Muter's letter five days after it was 
transmitted by responding that the Baron would file his charges with the Executive as 
soon as he had the leisure time to do it.25 Colonel Muter was left at the mercy of his 
accuser's leisure until March 12, 1781. Baron von Steuben appeared before the House of 
Delegates and charged Colonel Muter with neglect of duty. Steuben represented to the 
House that the state had only 4,000 stand of small arms fit for duty and that the 
ammunition, bombs, shells, and cannon balls were in extreme disorder. The House 
responded by passing a resolution that called for a committee to be formed to confer with 
23 Thomas Jefferson to George Muter, March 2, 1781, JP, 5:45-46. 
24 George Muter to Jonathan Walker, March 3, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 - September 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632,, 64-65. 
25 Jonathan Walker to George Muter, March 8, 1781, Ibid., 77. 
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the Commissioner of War and look into "such shameful neglect."26 Baron von Steuben 
had taken the liberty of going over Governor Jefferson's head and accused Colonel Muter 
in front of the House of Delegates. Hot on the heels of the resolution of the House, 
Colonel Muter received a letter from Mann Page, Jr., notifying him that the committee 
would meet with him that afternoon at five o'clock in his office.27 Colonel Muter had 
wanted an inquiry, but the language in the resolution suggested that the outcome was 
already determined. The House committee met with Colonel Muter and issued the 
following report on March 20, 1781: 
In short the whole business of the War Office appears to be entirely deranged 
arising from the following causes, the loss of the Papers belonging to the Office 
the want of a sufficient number of Assistants and the irregular manner in which 
the Business seems heretofore to have been conducted. Resolved that George 
Muter Esqr. The present Commissioner of the War Office is not qualified to fill 
that important Office and ought to be discharged therefrom. 28
The Committee decided that Colonel Muter had not neglected his duty but was 
simply unable to perform it competently. Baron von Steuben's charges had been of 
neglect, but should have been based on incompetence. The Committee found that 
Colonel Muter could answer few questions about the status of the state's military stores. 
The loss of the War Office records during Arnold's invasion prevented Colonel Muter 
from giving any answer but an educated guess. It also handicapped the primary function 
of the War Office, which was to provide military information to the Governor and 
26 Journal of House of Delegates, D, March 12, 1781, in Edith von Zemensky, ed., SP (NYHS,
microfilm ed.), LV, microfilm reel 4, 311. 
27 Mann Page, Jr., to George Muter, March 12, 1781, in William P. Palmer, ed., VCAL (New 
York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1968), 1 :568. 
28 "Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia: March 1781 Session," Bulletin of the Virginia 
State Library 27 (January 1928): 40-41. 
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Council. In addition, the Committee discovered that Baron von Steuben's assessment of 
the disorderly nature of the state's military stores was accurate.29 Colonel Muter, upon 
hearing of the resolution of the House, tendered his letter of resignation on March 22, 
1781: 
A Resolution of the Hon. the General Assembly (I am informed) has passed, 
requiring that I shall be dismissed from my appointment as Commissioner of the 
War Office. I am of opinion, that after having notice of such a Resolution's 
having passed, it becomes improper for me to act any longer as Commissioner: I 
must therefore beg leave to resign my appointment to that office, & request that 
your Excellency will be pleased to give orders for the papers belonging to that 
office, now in my custody, being examined & received by a proper person, 
authorized for that purpose. Conscious of having ever discharged my duty, as a 
Servant of the State, to the best of my power, I am enabled to bear up, under the 
pressure of the Resolution of the Legislature; and I am induced to assure your 
Excellency of my best exertions in the service of the State, in the station my 
resignation of the appointment will immediately place me, as Colonel of Infantry. 
I shall think myself honored by your Excellency's commands, and with pleasure 
and alacrity obey them.30
Governor Jefferson and the Council accepted it and immediately dispatched a 
letter to Colonel William Davies desiring to know if he would accept the appointment of 
Commissioner of the War Office.31 After his resignation, Colonel Muter wished to return
to his old duties as commander of the Virginia State Garrison Regiment, but due to the 
arrangement of the State Regiments on February 6, 1781, he was left without a command. 
Colonel Muter was mustered out of service on April 1, 1781. 
32 He was still willing,
however to serve his state. He notified Colonel William Davies, the new Commissioner ' 
of War, on May 5, 1781 that he was retiring to Albemarle County to reside with Colonel 
29 Ibid. 
30 George Muter to Thomas Jefferson, March 22, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 - September l, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632,, 92-93. 
31 Mcilwaine, ed., Journals, 2:315.
32 Sanchez-Saavedra, Guide, 22. 
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John Coles, but would gladly serve again ifhe were honored with a command.33
Colonel Muter would never again command troops for the state of Virginia. After the 
war had ended, he removed to Woodford County, Kentucky and started a new law 
practice, which would eventually lead to his election as Chief Justice of the Western 
District in 1785. 34 Colonel Muter remained in Kentucky until his death in May of 1811. 35
Colonel William Davies, the second Commissioner of the War Office, began his 
tenure four days after Colonel Muter' s resignation on March 22, 1781. 36 Like Colonel 
Muter, Davies had been a lawyer before the outbreak of hostilities. He was the oldest son 
of Samuel Davies, the Great Awakening divine, and was born in Hanover, Virginia in 
1749. By 1759, his family had removed to Princeton, New Jersey where William became 
the ward of Richard Stockton after the death of his father in 1761. William supported 
himself by reading law with Stockton and teaching grammar school until he completed 
his Master of Arts at the College of New Jersey in 1768. Shortly thereafter, Davies 
returned to Virginia and set up a law practice in Norfolk.37 By 1773, Davies had 
established himself as a prominent lawyer in Norfolk and formed a pact with other 
lawyers in town. They advertised in the Virginia Gazette on December 30, 1773 that 
they would no longer accept cases, save for merchant business, unless their fees were 
paid up front due to the complexity of the law practice, the smallness of their fees, and 
33 George Muter to Colonel Davies, May 5, 1781, VCAL, 2:87. 
34 George Muter, D, November 15, 1785, Ibid., 4:67. 
35 Stewart, Navy, 229. 
36 William Davies to James Hunter, March 26, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 - September 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 94. 
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the difficulties in collecting them. 38 In addition to his activities as a lawyer, Davies also 
was interested in local politics and active in the patriot cause. He served as the secretary 
of a meeting of "Freeholders, Merchants, Traders, and other inhabitants of the county and 
burough of Norfolk" which issued resolutions instructing their Burgesses to call for a 
Continental Congress, announcing support for the people of Boston against the 
Intolerable Acts, and asking everyone to support the Continental Association.39 By 
January of 1775, Davies had been elected as Secretary of the Norfolk Committee of 
Observation. As part of his duties he was required to advertise the Committee's findings 
in the Virginia Gazette. Whenever the Committee found a person in violation of the 
Association, Davies would publish its findings which would censure the guilty party 
publicly and request that people not associate with them in any way. For example, 
Davies placed an ad in the Virginia Gazette on March 23, 1775, in which the Committee 
censured the merchant John Brown for violating the Association by importing slaves into 
the country from Jamaica and attempting to conceal it from the Committee. The slaves 
were ordered to be sent back on the same ship with no other cargo.40 Davies continued 
his secretarial duties in July of 1775 by acting as the Secretary of the Norfolk Committee 
of Safety. He continued to place ads at the direction of the Committee, but instead of 
simply pointing out violations of the Continental Association, the Committee condemned 
men as traitors to the American cause. For example, on August 11, 1775, Davies placed 
an ad declaring John Schaw a traitor for identifying Alexander Main to Lord Dunmore as 
38 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), December 30, 1773, LV, microfilm reel 11, reel 4. 
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a fifer in one of the volunteer companies, resulting in Main's imprisonment aboard the 
sloop of war Otter.41 Davies also handled all of the Committee's correspondence. On
July 28, 1775, he wrote to the Virginia Convention stating the position of the Norfolk 
Committee on the resolution the Convention passed which called for restrictions on 
exporting provisions. The Norfolk Committee maintained that though it was a good 
resolution, it was enacted without any warning, leaving the merchants with too many 
goods on hand that would go to waste. They asked for its repeal until the merchants 
could satisfy their present contracts.42 While he continued to serve on the Committee of
Safety, Davies began to recruit a company of infantry in Princess Anne County. Davies 
hoped he would be able to qualify for the rank of captain under the provisions outlined by 
the third Virginia Convention on July 17, 1775 for raising troops for state defense. He 
was successful and was commissioned as a captain in the First Virginia Regiment of Foot 
on September 30, 1775.43 By October 14, 1775, Captain Davies had assembled his 
company, designated the fourth, and marched into Williamsburg.44 His regiment drilled 
in Williamsburg under General Andrew Lewis until ordered on Aug 16, 1776 to join 
Washington's army in New Jersey. Earlier in 1776, the First Virginia Regiment of Foot 
had been annexed into Continental service and Captain Davies now possessed a 
Continental commission instead of a state one. 45
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During his stay in Williamsburg, Captain Davies performed many regimental 
duties that proved he was a well-trusted and respected officer. On May 3, 1776, he 
served as President of a Court-Martial, which tried several men for various offenses 
ranging from encouraging desertion to drunkenness. 46 The fact that he was President of 
the Court-Martial demonstrates the confidence that his fellow officers placed in him. 
Captain Davies also was often asked to sign recommendations for promotions and 
commissions.47 His stay in the Williamsburg camp, however, was not without incident. 
On July 2, 1776, Colonel William Woodford claimed that Captain Davies and his brother 
John Davies were spreading false and scandalous reports in their correspondence about 
Woodford's conduct as an officer. Colonel Woodford ordered a Court oflnquiry to sit 
and render their opinion on the matter. 48 Captain Davies had some cause to be 
disgruntled with Colonel Woodford and may have censured him in his correspondence. 
Captain Davies was one of the many freeholders of Norfolk who lost the majority of their 
property in the looting and burning of that town.49 Possibly Davies held Colonel 
Woodford responsible for the looting and burning the American troops visited upon 
Norfolk after Lord Dunmore began his bombardment in January 1776. What is known is 
that if the inquiry resulted in censure or court martial for Captain Davies, it certainly did 
not affect his military career. It is clear that Colonel Woodford and Captain Davies did 
not like one another at all. Later in his career, Davies wrote to George Washington 
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referring to the "deep rooted aversion and I may say hatred, which General Woodford has 
invariably manifested towards me ever since the campaign at Norfolk."50 Despite his 
rivalry with Colonel Woodford, Captain Davies quickly rose in the ranks after the troops 
joined Washington in the North. 
In late 1776, Captain Davies was promoted to Major of the Seventh Virginia 
Continental Regiment. It appears, however, that he never actually served with the 
Seventh Regiment, as evidence indicates that he was captured following the surrender of 
Fort Washington on November 14, 1776.51 If Davies was taken prisoner, he was quickly 
exchanged and back in service in two months. Major Davies was promoted for the 
second time on February 21, 1777. He was given a Lieutenant Colonel's commission 
with the Fourteenth Virginia Regiment in order to replace Lieutenant Colonel Richard 
Meade, who was appointed to Washington's staff His new regiment, marching from 
Virginia, did not arrive at Washington's camp in Morristown, New Jersey until July of 
1777. Later in the year, Lieutenant Colonel Davies and the Fourteenth Regiment saw 
action as part of General George Weedon's Brigade at the Battles of Brandywine and 
Germantown. Davies served as the Lieutenant Colonel of the Fourteenth Virginia 
Regiment until the resignation of Colonel Charles Lewis allowed him to be promoted to 
Colonel and Regimental Commander on March 20, 1778. 52 
Davies had risen quickly in the ranks and had proven himself a competent and 
able officer on many occasions. While serving in the Fourteenth Regiment, Colonel 
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Davies was honored with the appointment of sub-inspector on March 28, 1778. On that 
day, General Washington had given General Baron von Steuben the temporary 
appointment of Inspector General of the Army. Steuben's task was to tum the American 
forces into a professional army.53 Steuben appointed five sub-inspectors, who were to 
learn the manual of drills from Steuben and then teach them to the rest of the army. 
Colonel Davies was obviously thought of as a highly competent officer to be chosen as 
one of five sub-inspectors. His new duties meant detached service from the Fourteenth 
Regiment, but he still retained nominal command. He was now responsible for drilling 
all the troops and inspecting the various military posts in the northern theatre of the war. 
So trusted was Colonel Davies that he was given the responsibility of inspecting West 
Point, the most important military post in North America. 54 While Davies was engaged 
in his sub-inspector duties, an arrangement of the Virginia Continental Regiments was 
held at White Plains, New York on September 10, 1778. In this arrangement, Colonel 
Davies's regiment was renumbered the Tenth Virginia Regiment and, in general, the 
Virginia troops were reduced from fifteen to eleven regiments due to insufficient 
manpower. Colonel Davies was issued a new commission dated September 14, 1778 as 
Colonel of the Tenth Virginia Regiment.55 He still retained nominal command of the 
Tenth Regiment while on sub-inspector duty but, in May 1779, at Middlebrook, New 
Jersey, another arrangement of the Virginia Regiments took place. In this arrangement, 
Colonel Davies's regiment was merged with the First Regiment and ordered to go south, 
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where it eventually was captured at Charleston in May of 1780.56 Because the Tenth 
Regiment was now detached with the First Regiment, Colonel Davies had lost his field 
command but still served as a sub-inspector. 
After the arrangement at Middlebrook, Colonel Davies applied for and obtained a 
leave of absence, and returned to Virginia to attend to his private affairs. 57 He applied for 
the leave in order to survey the damage to his remaining property in Suffolk, which had 
been sacked by General Edward Mathews earlier that May. While in Virginia, Davies 
became aware that the General Assembly was looking for candidates to fill a position on 
the Continental Board of War. He immediately wrote to General Nathanael Greene 
seeking his recommendation for that position. Evidently, Davies and Greene had 
previously talked about Davies taking a position on the Virginia Board of War, but now 
Davies requested to serve instead on the Continental Board of War. This would allow 
him to retain his rank and half pay after the war. If Greene wrote a recommendation for 
Colonel Davies it has not been found, but Davies was nominated for the position on the 
Continental Board of War. William C. Houston of New Jersey nominated him, but 
Davies lost the appointment to Colonel William Grayson ofVirginia.58
Colonel Davies remained in Virginia until he received word from General 
Washington that if he wished to continue in the post of sub-inspector he would have to 
join the Virginia regiments going south under the command of General Woodford. 
Washington added that ifDavies's affairs were not completed and he could not join the 
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troops, General Woodford was authorized to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Cabell 
as sub-inspector.59 It must have been disheartening news to Colonel Davies to serve 
under General Woodford who so disliked him. Unfortunately for Davies, his situation 
went from bad to worse as he later explained: 
His Excellency directed me to join the Virginia troops on their march, but if it was 
inconveniant to signify it to General Woodford, who was empowered to appoint 
Colonel Cabell to be sub-inspector. I accordingly attended at this place 
[Petersburg, VA], but found that no command in the line had been reserved for 
me, that Colonel Gist without any right or justice had been given one of the 
regiments, owing as I am informed to a direction from General Woodford to 
exclude from the arrangement all officers serving in any of the staff departments, 
I therefore availed myself of the obliging permission his Excellency has given me, 
and Colonel Cabell was accordingly appointed Sub-Inspector on the 6th Post. The 
post of inspector without any command in the line is by no means agreeable, but 
the deep rooted aversion and I may say hatred, which General Woodford has 
invariably manifested towards me ever since the campaign at Norfolk decided me 
fully against serving with him, where I should be under his immediate command 
and without any acquaintance or interest with the commanding General, which 
could avail me against arbitrary or urtjust act of his, should he attempt any. 60
Colonel Davies's troubled past with General Woodford had come back to haunt 
him. Woodford's directions at the arrangement, whether intentionally aimed at Davies or 
not, had effectively relieved him of command of his regiment. With the loss of his field 
command, Davies refused to serve as sub-inspector under Woodford and complained to 
Washington. Washington answered Davies on April 20, 1780 that he was unaware of the 
reasons for appointing Colonel Nathaniel Gist over Davies, but supposed it was from the 
prevailing rumor that Davies planned to leave the service. Washington added that he had 
suggested Davies to General John P. G. Muhlenberg as the proper person to superintend 
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the gathering ofrecruits and levies in Virginia during the coming year.61 Washington had 
answered Davies's complaints in a manner which suggested that he would not overturn 
Gist's appointment and that Davies should find a new line of service to pursue instead. 
This was not the answer Colonel Davies was hoping for, but at least it offered the hope of 
future employment in Continental service. 
Colonel Davies's military career was now in a state oflimbo. He had been 
suggested to General Muhlenberg as a proper officer for superintending the recruiting 
service in Virginia, but the state's finances and military disasters in 1780 greatly retarded 
that endeavor. He was only able to watch in horror as Charleston fell and General Gates 
was defeated at Camden on August 16, 1780. He was still actively seeking a new duty 
when he was called into service to organize the militia against General Alexander 
Leslie's invasion of Virginia in October 1780. Before he was called out on this new duty, 
Colonel Davies had applied to Timothy Pickering to be appointed Deputy Quartermaster 
for the State of Virginia. Davies offered to serve in the post if the present candidate, 
Colonel William Finnie, resigned or was not appointed. In a letter to Governor Thomas 
Jefferson, Pickering discussed the need for a deputy quartermaster and Davies's 
application: 
Colonel Davies abilities are indesputable, and I do not know that his integrity is 
suspected: but whether he is industrious I am altogether uninformed. It seems too 
that he is of an uneasy disposition, and less accomodating than could be wished at 
a time when by every just means we should conciliate the affections of the people 
as so much depends on their good will. Yet upon the whole, from the vast 
superiority of his abilities, he may merit a preference to Colonel Finnie. 
However, I would not whish to decide the case.62
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Colonel Davies made a strong candidate for the position, but Colonel Finnie had 
already been suggested for the job. Perhaps Davies's "uneasy disposition" prevented 
Jefferson and Pickering from changing their opinion on Colonel Finnie. Judging from 
Colonel Davies's actions after being appointed Commissioner of the War Office, 
Pickering's worries about his disposition seem unfounded and based more on an 
unfamiliarity with Davies rather than on first hand knowledge. As to Pickering's 
comment on Davies being "less accomodating than could be wished," Davies's later 
actions as Commissioner of the War Office show him to be a stickler for the rules, but 
also demonstrated a willingness to bend them in certain situations. Before Davies got 
word that Colonel Finnie was appointed, General Alexander Leslie invaded Virginia and 
all available Continental officers in the state were called upon to oppose the invasion by 
assuming command of the militia called out by Governor Jefferson. General Muhlenberg 
immediately ordered Colonel Davies to begin arranging and drilling the militia so it could 
be sent to his camp for active duty in hemming the British in Portsmouth.63 While 
engaged in this duty, Colonel Davies's military career received an incredible boost from 
General Greene's appointment of General Baron von Steuben as commander in chief of 
Continental forces in the state of Virginia. Steuben and Davies had become friends when 
he served under Steuben as the senior sub-inspector at Valley Forge. Steuben, with the 
hardy approval of General Greene, immediately appointed Davies to superintend the 
recruiting service in the whole state. General Greene had left Steuben in Virginia to 
speed the process of building another southern Continental army, while he went south to 
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take charge of the remnants of General Gates's defeated army. Colonel Davies's new 
duties were to oversee the rebuilding of General Greene's new southern army. 64 
Colonel Davies was placed in command of the general rendezvous at Chesterfield 
Courthouse. Steuben ordered Davies to assemble and equip the new recruits as they 
arrived. He was also ordered to build barracks, renovate the courthouse into a hospital 
and turn the jails into magazines for the commissary and quartermaster. Under Colonel 
Davies, Chesterfield Courthouse quickly became the largest and most important 
recruiting and supply depot in Virginia.65
It was during this duty that Colonel Davies began to display the skills necessary to 
run the Virginia War Office. He became intimately familiar with the War Office and 
Colonel Muter as he tried to equip and assemble his recruits. At every tum Davies was 
met with obstacles that Colonel Muter and the War Office could not overcome. When 
Steuben and Davies wished to send recruits south to Greene in November of 1780, they 
found that the state had no money for clothing and that the militia had used all the 
available military equipment during Leslie's invasion.66 In response to this 
disappointment, Colonel Davies quickly established a tailor shop using skilled recruits 
and informed Governor Jefferson that he could also have deer skins dressed for 
breeches.67
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Colonel Davies' s innovations at Chesterfield were still not enough to alleviate the 
problems which were supposed to be handled by the Virginia War Office and the cash 
poor government. The recruits still suffered from a lack of clothing and equipment by 
mid-December 1780, but Davies managed to overcome this obstacle allowing Steuben to 
send off a detachment ofrecruits under Colonel John Greene to General Nathanael 
Greene.68 Colonel Davies's difficulties at Chesterfield were increased when Benedict 
Arnold invaded Virginia in early January of 1781. As Arnold advanced up the James 
River, Steuben ordered Colonel Davies to evacuate Chesterfield Courthouse and remove 
the stores and hospital. Davies quickly and efficiently evacuated Chesterfield and then 
proceeded with his nearly-naked recruits to a position opposite ofWestham to aid the 
state in the removal of their stores to the south side of the James River. His efficiency in 
carrying out his orders prompted General Steuben to claim that he was indebted to him 
on this occasion.69 As Arnold retreated down the James River after sacking Richmond, 
Colonel Davies returned to Chesterfield Courthouse to reestablish the post there while 
Steuben and the recruits proceeded to Petersburg. 70
Colonel Davies's duties were now even more difficult to accomplish due to 
Arnold's total disruption of the Virginia government and War Office. Davies, however, 
was quick to reconstitute his post and even add some improvements to it. The lack of 
clothing was still the foremost problem, so Davies had a shoe factory built and managed 
to get his tailors to put out fifty to sixty regimental coats per week. By March 18, 1781, 
Colonel Davies's factories had amassed a considerable supply of clothing to send to 
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General Greene. 71 Davies was displaying a talent for administrative duties that put 
Colonel Muter and the War Office to shame. Governor Jefferson was so confident in his 
abilities that he requested Davies to submit a plan to clothe the Virginia troops in the 
future. In a letter to Captain John Peyton, the Clothier General for Virginia, Jefferson 
wrote that Colonel Davies "having been so kind as to consider the subject and furnish us 
with a plan and observations on the minuter parts of the business I beg leave to 
recommend them to your consideration, as they will furnish you with very useful ideas on 
the details of your office."72 
What is significant about Davies being asked to submit a clothing plan to the 
Virginia executive is that it would properly fall under the duties of Colonel Muter and the 
Virginia War Office. It suggests that Jefferson had already lost confidence in Muter's 
abilities and was seeking expert help from outside his administration. Colonel Davies 
was recognized as a highly efficient and able officer by his superiors and the Virginia 
government. General Greene even requested Steuben to consult with Colonel Davies on 
the proper forms for furloughs and discharges because Davies was "a man of great 
observation and has had long experience respecting the abuses prevailing in the army and 
state in this matter."73
While at Chesterfield Courthouse, Colonel Davies was finally rewarded for his 
hard work with a new regiment. General Greene had ordered that a new arrangement 
take place to reconstitute the Virginia Regiments, which had been annihilated in the 
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previous campaign under Generals Benjamin Lincoln and Horatio Gates. Colonel Davies 
was part of the Board of Officers that met at Chesterfield Courthouse to make the new 
arrangement on February 10, 1781. Because over thirteen hundred men were still 
captives in Charleston, the arrangement was mostly on paper only. Its purpose was 
essentially to determine the seniority of individual officers within the Virginia continental 
service. The arrangement, however, did create one new regiment and re-designate 
another.74 Colonel Davies was the recipient of the command of the newly-created First 
Virginia Regiment on February 12, 1781. He had finally regained the field command 
denied him by General Woodford's arrangement of the regiments.75 The Ninth Virginia 
Regiment was renumbered to be the Seventh and the rest of the Virginia troops, 
consisting of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth regiments, contained 
prisoners and existed on paper. 76 Colonel Davies' s new regiment also existed on paper 
only and consisted of himself and other officers who had escaped capture at Charleston. 
The plan was to recruit the First Regiment and send it on to Greene.77 
Although Colonel Davies seemed to fare well in this new arrangement there were 
other problems. It seems that General Weedon, who had resigned in 1778 over a dispute 
in rank, was ordered to be included in the new arrangement and a number of officers, led 
by Colonel Davies, believed this was unfair. 78 Davies addressed several letters to 
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Greene, Steuben, Washington, and Congress outlining the reasons the officers opposed 
General Weedon's inclusion in the Virginia continental service. In a letter to Steuben, 
who was presiding over the arrangement, Davies wrote that General Weedon had been 
retired under unusual circumstances for three years while the rest of the officers included 
had continued to serve. Davies also maintained that the many changes in the 
organization of the army would make Weedon's inclusion troublesome. Davies's last 
reason probably strikes more to the heart of the Board of Officers' concerns. There now 
existed within the Virginia Continental service enough officers with more experience 
than Weedon who deserved promotion, if there were to be another general in the Virginia 
service. 79 Colonel Davies would have certainly been one of the men eligible for 
promotion to general, and was known as an ambitious officer. It is important, however, 
to note that Colonel Davies and the other officers on the Board made it known that they 
had nothing personal against General Weedon and even sent him a copy of their 
grievances so everything would be in the open. 80 In his letter to General Greene, Davies 
mentioned other occasions when officers in similar situations had been denied inclusion 
and that the Board based their opinion on "impartial justice."81 General Greene
responded to Davies's letter on March 30, 1781, stating that he disagreed with the Board 
on Weedon's situation and maintained that general officers belonged to the Continent at 
large and not to a particular state. Greene also added that Weedon's situation was 
misunderstood and when he resigned it had been in good standing and the fault lay with 
Congress's inability to delegate powers to alter the standing of officers of the same grade. 
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This was not the answer Davies desired, but Greene ended his letter by conveying he 
would leave it up to Congress and Washington to decide the matter. 82 Davies replied to 
Greene that although General Weedon's standing as an officer was different from the 
inferior ranks, the state's quota of troops determined the number of general officers. 
Since the quota was reduced, so should the number of general officers. He argued that 
the real point was that "the long absence of any officer from service on account of private 
resentments or private business, ought to be a sufficient bar to his resumption of his 
former command."83 Despite Colonel Davies's and the Board of Field Officers' attempts, 
General Weedon was included in the arrangement due to Washington's referring it to 
Congress, which took no action on the matter. It seems that Colonel Davies and the 
Board of Officers let the matter drop once they realized that no action was going to be 
taken in their favor. Colonel Davies must have been disappointed, but he did not let that 
affect his working relationship with General Weedon. In fact, their correspondence 
indicates a good working relationship and a high respect for the abilities and opinions of 
each other. 84
While Colonel Davies was busy with the arrangement and his duties at 
Chesterfield Courthouse, Colonel Muter and the War Office were suffering the political 
fallout from Benedict Arnold's invasion. Colonel Muter was being investigated by a 
special committee, which delivered its report on March 20, 1781. The result of the report 
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was a resolution passed in the House of Delegates for Colonel Muter to be discharged. 
The Senate made it official on March 21, 1781. 85 On that same day a group of gentleman 
visited Colonel Davies at Chesterfield Courthouse and requested that he offer himself as 
a candidate for the post of Commissioner of the War Office. Colonel Davies 
immediately wrote to General Steuben for his opinion on the matter and requested that 
"this application may be secret and confidential." Colonel Davies was interested in the 
prospect of holding the office and thought he could be "of use in it" and that the War 
Office could "use my endeavors."86 Before Steuben could reply to Davies's letter, 
Colonel Muter resigned as Commissioner of the War Office. Governor Jefferson and the 
Council received Muter's resignation on March 22, 1781 and immediately dispatched a 
letter to Colonel Davies appointing him to the post. 87 
Governor Jefferson wrote Davies that the Council had appointed him to succeed 
Colonel Muter and that they would do all in their power to persuade him to take the post. 
Jefferson ended the letter with a plea to Colonel Davies writing that "in the mean time I 
hope it will be in your power to come immediately to the office, as its duties are such as 
to admit of no intermission and impossible to be executed by the Executive in addition to 
their other duties."88 Jefferson and the Council were desperate for Colonel Davies's help. 
Colonel Davies was eager for the position on the flattering terms that it was offered, but 
would have to receive the permission of his immediate superiors in order to accept. On 
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March 23, 1781, Colonel Davies wrote General Steuben to solicit his permission to act in 
the office: 
In my last I mentioned to you that application had been made to me respecting the 
post of Commissioner of the War Office. I observed that I thought I might 
probably be of some use in it, and that if you approved of it I would be glad of 
your interest in the matter. Since I wrote I have been informed of Colonel 
Muter's resignation, and have this evening received a very polite letter from his 
Excellency the Governor informing me that the Executive had appointed me to 
that office, and requesting to know whether I would accept of it. In answer I have 
accepted it conditionally, alledging that as I was under your immediate orders, I 
could not leave this post without your particular permission, and that as I 
belonged to the service of the continent more immediately, I could not therefore 
accept the appointment determinately, untill I could obtain the permission of 
Congress or the Commanding General, as I could not think of giving up my 
commission and rank in the army with all the emoluments allotted, tho' at a 
distant period, for the officers; and after having spent the most valuable part of 
my youth in the service of my country, to throw myself into a state of dependance 
upon an office, which the next session of Assembly may entirely abolish. Aware 
of this inconvenience his Excellency without sollicitation is kind enough to say 
his endeavors shall not be omitted to obtain every permission from the 
commanding officer or other person which may be necessary to reconcile my 
acting in that office to the reservation of any other interests I may wish to retain. 
Under these circumstances I would beg your permission in the first instance, and 
your interest in the next with Congress and the Commanders in chief, that I may 
be allowed to act in this department, as long as my services can by any means be 
dispensed with in the field. I would wish to have it in my power to act in the 
field, whenever it should be necessary, and I would wish too, to have the 
allowance of half pay & land and reimbursement for depreciation which all other 
officers have; but if I lose my commission by accepting this appointment, I shall 
of course be deprived of all those privileges and advantages. I do not mean, 
however, to ask any pay from the continent while I act in the war office but only 
to be put on the same footing that the members of the board of war were in 
Philadelphia as expressed in the resolution of Congress of the ih of July 1779, 
which allowed them to hold their rank in the army, but to be paid only as 
commissioners. There are many precedents on the continent in favor of my 
request. General Clinton is Governor of New York and General McDougal a 
delegate in Congress, and yet both those officers retain their rank in the army. As 
to the officers of the Virginia line several of them have expressed their wish that I 
would undertake to act in this post, and I hope it would be for their advantage to 
have the department put into the hands of a continental officer. From the urgency 
of the Governor's application to me to accept the office, and his pressing request 
that I will immediately undertake the business of it, I propose to repair to 
Richmond tomorrow .... 89 
89 William Davies to Baron Steuben, March 23, 1781, SP, 4:383. 
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This letter clearly showed he wanted to act as Commissioner of War, but that 
many impediments stood in his way. Despite his eagerness and that of the Virginia 
Executive, Colonel Davies was too shrewd to cast away the advantages of his present 
situation for the uncertain prospects of the Virginia War Office. His rank and 
emoluments represented all the wealth that he could hope to obtain after the war was over 
and it would be folly to lose them. That is the reason he only accepted the post 
conditionally. The letter also made it clear that Colonel Davies did not foresee any 
opposition to his serving in the post from his superior officers. On this part, Colonel 
Davies was right on the mark. Both Steuben and Greene enthusiastically endorsed his 
application. Steuben notified Greene ofDavies's appointment on March 30, 1781 
expressing that Colonel Davies was the "properest person" for the post and would render 
great service in it.90 General Greene was pleased about Colonel Davies's appointment 
and wrote to Colonel Davies on April 11, 1781: 
Nothing would induce me to consent to your taking the direction of the war 
department; but a persuasion that you can render more important services to the 
public in general and not less to the army in particular by holding that office than 
without it. However you must continue at times to assist all in your power to 
compleat the arrangement of the army. I believe no state abounding with such a 
plenty as Virginia, ever experienced such a scarcity for want of order and proper 
application of her supplies. From your abilities and application I am in hopes 
there will be a great reformation, but before you engage in this business give me 
leave to tell you it will be difficult under the best arrangement to keep pace with 
the demands of the service, and therefore don't get discouraged because you 
cannot at once effect what you wish and what is absolutely requisite.91 
90 Baron Steuben to Nathanael Greene, March 30, 1781, NGP, 8:14-16. 
91 Nathanael Greene to William Davies, April 11, 1781, Ibid, 8:80-82. 
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The wise general praised Colonel Davies's abilities, but also warned of the 
difficulties involved in the task. With the endorsement of Steuben and Greene, Colonel 
Davies needed to pass one other hurdle before he could accept the post of Commissioner 
of the War Office. Unfortunately for Colonel Davies, it proved to be impassible on the 
terms he wished. True to his promise, Governor Jefferson had solicited Congress in favor 
of Colonel Davies's appointment to the War Office while retaining his rank and 
emoluments. Jefferson wrote to the Virginia Delegates asking for their support, citing the 
numerous examples of Continental officers holding civil positions while still actively 
holding rank. His examples included officers such as Governor George Clinton of New 
York and General Alexander McDougall, a delegate in Congress.92 Jefferson also wrote 
a letter to Samuel Huntington, the President of Congress, stating that the post of 
Commissioner of the Virginia War Office was essential to Virginia and the Continent and 
that they could find no one else worthy and willing to do the job.93 Despite Jefferson's 
appeals and the logic of his argument, Congress decided that Colonel Davies could not 
hold the position while retaining his rank and emoluments. It considered the 
Commissioner of the War Office to be a civil post and therefore an active military officer 
would be ineligible to hold it.94 The best the Virginia Delegates in Congress could 
manage was a compromise that would allow Colonel Davies to retire without losing any 
emoluments to which he was entitled.95 This was not acceptable to Colonel Davies as he 
wished to retain his active duty status and rank. 
92 Thomas Jefferson to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, March 26, 1781, JP, 5:251. 
93 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, March 26, 1781, Ibid., 5:246-47. 
94 Samuel Huntington to Thomas Jefferson, April 18, 1781, VCAL, 2:53.
95 Virginia Delegates to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1781, Ibid., 2:50-52. 
52 
Indeed, Colonel Davies was rather shocked that Congress had barred his way by 
considering the Commissioner of the War Office as a civil post. General Greene had 
given his approval and clearly considered the post as part of the state military 
establishment. In response to General Steuben's inquiry, Greene had written that the 
regulations of Congress only barred an officer from holding "two offices under 
Congress" and not a state and continental office simultaneously.96 Greene would not 
have made such a ruling if he did not consider the Commissioner of the War Office as a 
state military office. At any rate, the resolution of Congress stood. If Colonel Davies 
wished to accept the appointment to the War Office, he would have to give up his rank 
and active status in the Continental Army. Colonel Davies had maintained all along that 
he would not accept the appointment on such conditions. By the time Governor Jefferson 
received word of Congress's determination on the matter, Colonel Davies had been 
acting as the interim Commissioner for almost a month. Steuben had given Colonel 
Davies permission to act on March 26, 1781.97 Greene, Steuben and Jefferson all agreed 
that Colonel Davies was the right man for the job, but could not prevail on Davies to 
relinquish his rank in the army. A compromise was needed and it fell to General Greene, 
as Commander in chief of the Southern army, to arrange one. Since Virginia had so few 
men in the field and Colonel Christian Febiger, whose commission had seniority over 
Davies's, was available to take over Davies's duties in recruiting, Colonel Davies could 
remain as acting Commissioner of the Virginia War Office until Virginia had raised 
enough recruits to require his attendance in the field. This meant that Colonel Davies 
96 Nathanael Greene to Baron Steuben, April 15, 1781, NGP, 8:98-99. 
97 William Davies to Baron Steuben, March 27, 1781, SP, 4:406. 
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was able to act as Commissioner of the War Office, but that he would not be officially 
appointed to that post. In fact, Colonel Davies never took an oath of office even though 
required by law and never made use of any official signature annexed to his name.98 As 
part of the compromise, Colonel Davies was left off the Continental payrolls and 
subsisted on the salary of the Commissioner of the War Office. He still drew Continental 
forage and rations as he continued to perform some Continental duties from time to time, 
as assigned by General Greene.99
While Colonel Davies and Jefferson were waiting on the resolution of Congress, 
Colonel Davies waded into the confused business of the Virginia War Office. He 
officially began entering letters in the War Office Letter Book on March 26, 1781, four 
days after Colonel Muter had resigned.100 As one of his first acts as interim
Commissioner of War, Colonel Davies began to streamline the business of the War 
Office. He applied to Jefferson to allow one of the officers of the new State Regiment to 
do the duty of Town Major in Richmond and to superintend the public works. He 
complained to Jefferson that "It is impossible for the duties of this office to be done 
without confusion, if the Commissioner's attention is perpetually distracted with orders 
for provision for this man, and rum for another, and a pair of shoes for a third."101 The 
duties of the War Office were vague and confusion reigned supreme when Colonel 
98 William Davies to Benjamin Walker, January 10, 1782, EWOLB August 1, 1782- July 12 1786 
and December 24, 1781 - February 28, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 27-30. 
99 William Davies to Richard Claiborne, November 14, 1781, WOLB November 2, 1781 - January 
22, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm 632, 54-56. 
100 William Davies to James Hunter, March 26, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781- September 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm 632, 94. 
101 William Davies to Thomas Jefferson, March 26, 1781, JP, 5:244-46. 
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Davies assumed the duties of the post. In addition to the confusion in the War Office, 
Davies was still under Steuben's orders to superintend the recruiting at Chesterfield Court 
House. Colonel Davies tried to explain to Steuben the impossibility of doing both jobs, 
but failed. In the end Davies was prevailed upon to do both duties by attending 
Chesterfield on "Saturdays after noon and Sundays." In order to relieve himself of 
around the clock work at both positions, he requested an additional clerk for the War 
Office, which Jefferson granted on a temporary basis.102 Colonel Davies was now
overcome with work but diligently attended to his duties. 
As Davies began the business of reorganizing the Virginia War Office, an 
interesting development occurred. The General Assembly had requested that Governor 
Jefferson submit a new plan of operation for the War Office before the next session. 
Governor Jefferson, already planning to resign when the next session met, referred the 
matter to his new interim Commissioner. Colonel Davies was placed in the enviable 
position of writing his own job description. In a letter to General Greene, Colonel Davies 
stated that the War Office "stands upon a very insufficient footing" and that the state's 
quartermaster department was in a "deplorable and indeed ridiculous situation."103
Colonel Davies planned to rectify the weaknesses of the Virginia War Office in hopes of 
establishing regularity and efficiency. He immediately set about developing a plan for 
the operation of the War Office. He had until the May 1781 session of the General 
Assembly to assemble the plan, but due to the invasion of Virginia by Generals Phillips 
and Cornwallis the General Assembly had to meet in June at Staunton. Colonel Davies 
102 William Davies to Thomas Jefferson, March 30, 1781, Ibid., 5:290-91. 
103 William Davies to Nathanael Greene, April 2, 1781, NGP, 8:26-27. 
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submitted his plan to the Executive Council on June 18, 1781. He considered his present 
employment as Commissioner of the War Office, and his six years of service in various 
military branches as qualifications enough to offer his opinion to the Council. He also 
asked that it pass along his plan to the legislature with any observations they might have. 
Colonel Davies plan pointed out that: 
... frequent examination, is the way to make men diligent as well as honest; 
without it, fraud and negligence would soon exhaust the riches of a country much 
more wealthy than ours-From this cause chiefly, originate the complaints which 
so generally prevail, of mismanagement in the several military departments. With 
an infinate variety of business on the hands of the Executive, it will always be 
impossible for them to attend to scrutinies of this kind; and of course they will 
never be able to obtain a just knowledge of the real state or application of the 
stores and resources of the country. This then is one of the great duties of the War 
Office, to prepare for the inspection of government, such documents as will 
enable them to form proper ideas of the state of the public supplies, and of the 
conduct of their servants in the discharge of the duties of their several 
appointments. 104
Colonel Davies was not proposing a new idea, but merely reinforcing an old one. 
The War Office was always intended to collect and report all military information to the 
Executive. Colonel Davies was maintaining that, although this was obvious, it had not 
always been practiced. In order to correct this problem, he suggested that the 
Commissioner of the War Office be vested by law "with an inquisitorial power, and have 
authority to demand from the different military departments exact returns of their receipts 
and issues, and of all other matters incident to their offices, according to the nature of 
their respective employments."105 Colonel Davies was insisting that the Commissioner
have real authority delegated by law instead of implied through the authority of the 
Governor. Under the Act of 1780, the Commissioner of the War Office had no powers 
10
4 William Davies to the Executive, June 18, 1781, VCAL, 2:166-69.
105 Ibid.
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spelled out for him in the law, save what the Executive decided to give him. This 
resulted in a powerless Commissioner who could request information but had no punitive 
measures to enact if the request was ignored. Under Davies's plan, the military 
departments were required by law to deliver periodic returns to the Commissioner. 
Colonel Davies's plan also detailed what returns should be sent to the War Office from 
the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Clothing departments. He listed the several 
complaints about the mismanagement in those departments that could be avoided by 
investing the Commissioner of War with an inquisitorial power. He also mentioned that 
the Commissary of Military stores should make periodic returns to the War Office as well 
as oversee the laboratories and magazines in the state. His plan went beyond just the 
military departments to include the Auditor's Office. He maintained that returns of 
articles impressed by the various military departments and settled at the Auditor's Office 
should be made to the War Office in order that they may count against the Continental 
quota required from the state. He further stated that this would allow the Executive to 
detect the great abuses which occur during impressments and put a stop to them. 106
Evidently, the War Office had not been keeping such records before Davies suggested it, 
which meant that Virginia was paying out more than its quota required. 
Another major suggestion in Colonel Davies's plan for the War Office was that 
the Commissioner of the War Office should be allotted the duties of the Adjutant 
General's department. All of the Executive's orders should issue through the War Office 
to prevent confusion and descriptive lists and rosters should be lodged there as well. This 
was a powerful suggestion, because previously the War Office would sometimes order 
106 Ibid. 
57 
one thing and find that the Executive had ordered another. Colonel Davies was trying to 
avoid the confusion caused by a splintered chain of command. It would also mean that 
an order from the Commissioner of War would carry the same weight as if it were from 
the Governor. Colonel Davies's plan quickly vested the Commissioner of the War Office 
with real power and moved him away from simply being another clerk for the Executive. 
Davies, however, was aware that even the Commissioner needed some check against his 
powers. Davies's plan stated: 
He [the Commissioner] should at all times be responsible to the Executive for his 
conduct, and controllable by them; yet it will be wrong to subject him to the delay 
of taking their opinion in every step he may think necessary for the public good, 
and of having their previous approbation as a prerequisite, before he can do 
anything, as is the case at present. It is sufficient that the Executive can interfere 
when they please, and give him such orders as they think proper. A prudent 
Commissioner however, will, for his own security crave their advice and 
directions on every matter of importance in his department: the officer should be 
displaced that would not. 107
Colonel Davies recognized the need for the Commissioner of the War Office to 
have real power in order to execute his duties. His plan allowed the office some 
autonomy while still subjecting it to the power of the Governor and Executive Council. 
He also recommended that a few clerks be allowed in case the Commissioner had to be 
out of the office on business. 108
Colonel Davies submitted this plan to the Executive Council on June 18, 1781, 
the same day that the House of Delegates brought in a bill to regulate the department of 
the War Office. It is assumed that the Executive Council transmitted Colonel Davies's 
plan to the legislature because the House of Delegates debated the bill on June 20, 1781 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
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and made several amendments to their original bilI. 109 The next day the bill was passed 
in the House and sent to the Senate which returned the bill with several amendments. 
The House agreed with the Senate's amendments and passed "An Act to regulate the 
Department of the War Office."110
Colonel Davies must have been elated to find that the new War Office Act was 
almost a direct copy of the plan he submitted to the Executive. The legislature had 
obviously used it in determining the new War Office's functions. The act vested the 
Commissioner with an inquisitorial power and even spelled out for each department the 
kind of returns that were required and set up a periodical schedule for their filing. The 
Act also gave the Commissioner the powers of the Adjutant General's department and 
even spelled them out as in Davies's plan. The most important part of the new act, 
however, was the clause which gave the Commissioner of War the autonomy he needed 
to function efficiently. The Commissioner received the authority to "Superintend the 
establishment of magazines, regularity of issues, and shall in general direct and manage 
all matters and things within the department of war, as well as all persons holding offices 
or performing duties within that department."111 This clause provided the Commissioner 
of War sweeping powers to do his duty, but the most important part was what was left 
out. There was no restraining clause that required that the Commissioner act only under 
direct orders from the Governor. Colonel Davies had received the autonomy he knew 
would be needed to operate the War Office efficiently. 
109 Journal of the House ofDelegates of Virginia, May 1781 Session, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm
reel 331, 39. 
110 Ibid., 47. 
111 Hening, Statutes, 10:426-29. 
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Colonel Davies continued to serve as Commissioner of the Virginia War Office 
until December 1782. After the Siege of Yorktown, the prospects of peace with Great 
Britain had been increasing in the minds of the General Assembly and it began to 
dismantle the military establishment in Virginia. With peace thought to be on the 
horizon, the General Assembly quickly moved to relieve Virginia of its wartime tax 
burden and expenses. One of the first cuts in Virginia's military establishment was the 
Virginia War Office. A bill was introduced in the House to repeal all of the acts relating 
to the War Office on November 20, 1782. 112 Colonel Davies was hardly pleased as he
felt that the War Office was finally getting all the military departments into order. In a 
letter to Richard Henry Lee, he insisted that the bill was directed against the War Office 
on other grounds rather than financial concerns. He wrote that the state needed the War 
Office "but a few gentlemen have conceived a jealousy that there is danger to the 
constitution in entrusting any authority to the Commissioner of War, because I happen to 
be an officer in the army."113 Colonel Davies clearly thought that the War Office was a 
necessity to his state and could not comprehend why these gentlemen feared a position, 
which was subject to the immediate control of the Executive. 
Despite Colonel Davies's opinion, the General Assembly passed an act, which 
repealed all the legislation relating to the War Office on December 24, 1782.114 The act 
abolished the Virginia War Office and returned all of its duties to the Executive or 
whomever they chose to appoint. The act also instructed Colonel Davies to tum over all 
112 Journal of the House of Delegates, October 21, 1782, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm reel 33 l a, 26. 
113 William Davies to Richard Henry Lee, January 5, 1782, WOLB November 2, 1781 -January 
22, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 166. 
114 Journal of the House of Delegates, October 21, 1782, in VGAHJ, LV, microfilm reel 331a, 79. 
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of the War Office's accounts, books and vouchers as well as any other public property to 
the Governor and Executive Council.115 Colonel Davies was aware of the developments
in the General Assembly and had already been preparing himself to give up the post of 
Commissioner ofWar. On December 9, 1782, Colonel Davies wrote Governor Harrison 
that he was ready to settle his accounts and deliver up the War Office whenever so 
commanded. His only request was that he be allowed to settle with warrants, as he had 
not been paid a farthing since August of 1779.116 The Executive replied on December 11,
1782 instructing Colonel Davies to deliver his papers to the Clerk of the Council. 117 It is
interesting to note that six days later the Executive Council was forced to appoint Thomas 
Meriwether as an additional clerk. The Council blamed its need for an additional clerk 
on its increased business due to the abolition of the War Office.118 Colonel Davies had
been right that the state still needed the Virginia War Office. 
After leaving the War Office, Colonel Davies began to rebuild his life as a lawyer. 
He had wished to remain in the army but "being the youngest Colonel in the Virginia 
Line" he found that as Congress cut back its military establishment, he was to be 
retired. 119 In the arrangement held at Winchester Barracks in January 1783, Colonel
Davies was officially mustered out of service as the Colonel of the First Virginia 
Regiment. The arrangement as a whole simply wiped away the paper establishment that 
115 Hening, Statutes, 11: 133-34. 
116 William Davies to the Governor, December 9, 1782, VCAL, 3:393. 
117 H. R. Mcilwaine and Wilmer L. Hall, eds., Journals of the Council of the State of Virginia 
(Richmond: LV, 1952), 3:189. 
118 Ibid., 3:193-94. 
119 William Davies to the Governor, December 9, 1782, VCAL, 3:393. 
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had been created at the Chesterfield Arrangement in 1781. 120 He was now faced with the 
task ofrebuilding his law practice. Unfortunately for Davies, he had lost most of his law 
books and property in Norfolk and Suffolk during the war. With nothing tying him down 
in Chesapeake, Davies moved to Petersburg and set up a new law practice after the war. 
He may have moved to Petersburg in order to court Mary Murry Gordon, the widow of 
Alexander Gordon of Petersburg, whom he eventually married. 121 As he resumed his law 
practice, he kept his eye on the political situation in Virginia. When it became known 
that agents for the state were to be elected to settle Virginia's accounts with the United 
States, William Davies offered himself as a candidate. In 1788 he was elected and 
traveled to Philadelphia and New York attending the business of the settlement. He was 
perhaps the most qualified man for this endeavor as the former head of the War Office. 
He was intimately familiar with both the state and Continental supply systems and had 
served during General William Phillips's invasion of Virginia and the campaign at 
Yorktown. This gave him personal knowledge of many of the claims against the 
Continent. Through his efforts, Virginia was able to get a satisfactory settlement with the 
United States, which did justice to the claims ofVirginia. 122 After returning from his
employment as State Agent, William Davies moved back to Norfolk and was appointed 
Collector of the Port by President John Adams in 1800. He lived there until his death on 
December 23, 1805. 123
120 Sanchez-Saavedra, Guide, 28. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE CHALLENGES OF THE WAR OFFICE 
The War Office Records provide an interesting glimpse into the hardships of 
planning, supplying, and waging war. These records clearly demonstrate the issues that 
affected the strategies and preparations for war in the Commonwealth of Virginia. The 
duties of the War Office were broadly defined and encompassed almost every aspect of 
the war effort. The Commissioner of War's duties ranged from adjutant general to 
superintendent of the Commonwealth's military factories and beyond. Naturally, a 
public official charged with so many responsibilities would face multiple trials in 
carrying out his job. He confronted many obstacles that were beyond his control, but that 
had to be overcome for the good of the war effort. 
The first major problem facing the War Office was the lack of information on the 
state's ability to wage war, which affected every aspect of the war effort and the state's 
ability to plan accordingly. The Commissioner of War viewed the gathering and 
reporting of information to government as "one of the great duties of the War Office."1
In fact, it was the primary responsibility of the War Office to gather information so that it 
could accurately report to the government on the condition of the state's war machine. 
Unfortunately for the Commissioner of War, many impediments stood in his way of 
procuring accurate information. 
From the beginning, one of the most frustrating obstacles in collecting 
information was the willful neglect or outright refusal of the state's own military staff 
departments and County Lieutenants to report information to the War Office. One of the 
first surviving records of the War Office is a letter from Governor Jefferson to 
1 William Davies to the Executive, June 18, 1781, VCAL, 2: 166-69. 
Commissioner of War Muter, in which Jefferson complains about the State Commissary 
not obeying two previous orders to file a return and asks the Commissioner to issue a 
third order.2 It is interesting to note that the Commissioner of War's powers at this point 
were defined by the Governor, and therefore when the Commissioner of War was writing 
to request information it was assumed the order really come from the Governor. This 
example clearly illustrates that the origin of the order did not concern the Commissary at 
all. 
Other departments were also at fault. Colonel Muter complained about "No 
account from the Quarter Master General's department for articles and services furnished 
the continent have ever come in to be examined."3 The staff departments were also 
negligent in dealing with the second Commissioner of War, Colonel William Davies. 
This took place despite the fact that the Assembly had tried to help the War Office by 
making it a law, not just an order from the Executive, for the staff departments to file 
returns with the War Office. Colonel Davies ordered the Commissary General of 
Provision, John Browne, to provide an immediate return of his department. To induce 
him to comply, Davies added: 
I enclose you an extract from an act for regulating the war department; for your 
more particular information, and to show you how far you and I are connected. 
The business prescribed in it is essentially necessary to be immediately attended 
to, and I must insist upon a speedy compliance with the law, and request a state of 
your department to the first of July.4 
2Thomas Jefferson to George Muter, May 27, 1780, VWOLB 1779-1781, WOR, LV, microfilm 
reel 264, 60. 
3 George Muter to Quarter Master General for State, December 11, 1780, WOLB July 21, 1780-
January 2, 1780, WOR, L V microfilm reel 632, 72. 
4 William Davies to Browne Commissary General of Purchase, no date, WOLB January 18, 1781 
- September 1, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 151-152.
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Unfortunately, even the Assembly's measures to aid the War Office proved 
ineffectual in getting the reports filed in the War Office. The state military staff 
departments were not the only culprits in failing to make proper and timely returns. The 
County Lieutenants, who administered the affairs of government at the local level, were 
also delinquent. Many other local officials like the Commissioners of the Provision Law 
and the Commissioners of the Specifics Tax were also offenders. The local county 
officials were responsible for their county's supplies and militia and were therefore 
supposed to report their condition to the War Office. Colonel Davies constantly 
complained to the County Lieutenants and the various Commissioners about their 
inattention to filing their returns. He was quite fond of reminding his correspondents that 
their returns were required by the law. 5
Receiving returns was not the only problem the War Office faced in gathering 
information. When the Commissioner of War received a return it was frequently 
incomplete, or worse, exaggerated in its scope. Colonel Muter complained to an 
unknown correspondent, but probably a member of the Assembly, that though many 
County Lieutenants had made returns, "this however has by no means produced full 
returns."6 Colonel Davies added that "the regularity of returns is so generally neglected 
by County Lieutenants" that "government have it not in their power to make any 
equitable distribution" of muskets to the militias of the various counties.7 With his keen 
5 William Davies to Commissioners of Provision Law, August 14, 1781, Ibid., 214. and William 
Davies to County Lieutenants, October 12, 1782, WOLB May 6, 1782 - October 12, 1782, WOR, LV, 
microfilm reel 633, 160. 
6 George Muter to (Unknown), December 29, 1780, WOLB July 21, 1780 - January 2, 1781, 
WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 81. 
7 William Davies to County Lieutenant of Richmond, August 30, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781-
November 1, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 9-10. 
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attention to detail, Colonel Davies often mentioned the faults of particular returns. In a 
letter to Major Richard Call, he observed that the dragoon who delivered the Major's 
return was wearing a shabby uniform, but the return itself did not mention a single coat or 
waistcoat. Colonel Davies remarked that he hoped the dragoons were not naked as 
represented in the return. 8 A more serious problem than an incomplete return was an 
exaggerated one. The Commissioner of War also addressed this issue with Major Call: 
I will conclude with one friendly remark, that it is bad policy in a corps to 
exaggerate its wants. Government will be more disposed to supply a corps that is 
half equipped than one that has hardly anything, both because they despair of ever 
equipping them, and because it will unavoidably occasion some small diffidence 
of the care of the Officers. I am persuaded, considering the frequent applications 
of Lee's and Nelson's Corps, you will not think this hint amiss.9
Obviously, incomplete and exaggerated returns affected the ability of the War 
Office to assess need properly and supply the various departments under the War Office. 
This, however, was not the only problem with the information contained in the returns. 
Upon occasion, the information in a return was presented in such a confusing manner that 
the Commissioner of War could not decipher what the return was trying to report. 10 In 
addition to these problems with information gathering, the War Office had to deal with 
many other issues that affected their ability to report accurate information to government. 
Letters could take quite a long time to reach their intended destination and it was quite 
easy for them to miscarry altogether. 
Another issue was the invasion of the state by the British. Each time the British 
arrived, it caused supplies and men to be dispersed in an emergency fashion which was 
8 William Davies to Major Call, August 26, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 - September 1, 1781, 
WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 209-210. 
9 Ibid. 
10 William Davies to Colonel Francis Taylor, August 10, 1781, Ibid., 166. 
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often unorganized. The most glaring example was the sacking of Richmond and 
Westham by Benedict Arnold in early January of 1781. Unfortunately for Colonel 
Muter, the acting Commissioner of War, the records of the state were mistakenly 
deposited in a magazine at Westham during Arnold's invasion and were destroyed. This 
was a real blow to the state and especially to the War Office, since it lost all the 
information it had gathered prior to the invasion. 11 The ultimate consequence of the loss 
was the dismissal of Muter and the appointment of Colonel Davies as the Commissioner 
of War. In addition to invasion by the enemy, the War Office had to contend with 
improper forwarding of supplies and unauthorized seizures which inevitably nullified the 
accuracy of the original return. 12 
The Commissioner of War, well aware of all of these obstacles, tried to use every 
means available to combat them. The War Office attempted various ways to obtain the 
information the government needed so badly. The most often used tactic was simply to 
write and complain to the offending party while reminding them of the law. When that 
approach failed, multiple letters were sent to remind the offender to file the returns. 13 In 
dealing with Continental Officers, who were not subject to control of the War Office but 
still had valuable information relating to the supply of the Virginia Continental Line, the 
Commissioner of War often had trouble getting the proper returns to make his plans. 
Colonel Davies's best tactic in this case was to apply directly to the Commander in Chief 
of the Southern Army, General Greene. On at least one occasion, when Davies was 
11 Malone, Jefferson the Virginian, 340. 
12 William Davies to Colonel Hendricks, September 17, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781 -
November 1, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 77-78. 
13 William Davies to Colonel Thinker, November 6, 1781, WOLB November 2, 1781 - January 
22, 1781, microfilm reel 632, 19. 
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frustrated in his attempts, he complained to General Greene about his inability to obtain 
returns of the Virginia Cavalry & Artillery from their officers. He asked Greene to order 
the officers to send the returns to the War Office. 14 In this manner, the Commissioner of 
War went over the heads of the noncompliant officers to achieve his goal. 
Another favorite tactic of Colonel Davies was to remind the County Lieutenants 
and staff departments that they were required by law to furnish the War Office with 
returns. When that failed to produce the desired effect, the Commissioner of War had 
other means at his disposal. In the case of John Browne, the Commissary General of 
Provision who refused to file returns, Colonel Davies asked for an enquiry into his 
conduct by the Executive Council. In a letter on July 19, 1781, the Commissioner of War 
admonished the Commissary for not providing information to the War Office "which was 
in a position to aid his department" with the consequence of a government enquiry into 
his conduct. 15 Luckily for Davies, the Commissary decided to resign rather than submit 
to the enquiry, and in doing so saved the Commissioner of War the trouble of conducting 
the investigation. Davies, in a letter to Governor Nelson, congratulated the country 
because it could now receive a better arrangement that would cause fewer problems for 
the War Office and better provisions for the troops. 16 The enquiry was but one tool the
Commissioner of War could use to overcome the negligence of some officers to file 
returns. On another occasion the Commissioner of War asked for a special resolution of 
14 William Davies to General Greene, September 28. 1782, WOLB May 6, 1782 - October 12, 
1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 155. 
15 William Davies to John Browne, July 19, 1781, Journal of the War Office January 18, 1781-
December 31, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 95. 
16 William Davies to Governor Nelson, September 6, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781 - November 
1, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 40-41. 
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the Executive Council requiring the manager of the arms factory in Fredericksburg to file 
monthly returns. The manager of the factory, Charles Dick, was supposed to be under the 
Commissioner's supervision, but had trouble making timely returns to the War Office. 17
In this way, the War Office hoped to reinforce the idea of timely returns without 
removing an important component in the public armory. 
The problems of inaccurate and exaggerated returns were handled in a different 
manner. Originally, the Commissioner of War provided specific instructions as to what 
he wanted in the return. The Commissioners of the Provision Law, for example, were to 
record the name and rank of individuals who drew supplies from them. They were also 
instructed to make returns to the Quarter Master of their forage and a return of provision 
to the Commissary General of Provision. 18 Colonel Davies, however, decided that the 
best way to ensure consistent information was to enclose forms in his circular letters and 
to instruct the County Lieutenants and staff departments to use the new forms. 19 It was 
hoped that if a standard form were used the returns would be complete and accurate. The 
officer filling out the form simply completed each column with the desired information. 
The issues that faced the War Office when gathering information for the 
government still remained, but the Commissioner of War did everything in his power to 
overcome them. The efficacy of the War Office can be judged by a report submitted to 
the General Assembly by the War Office on December 1781. In it, the War Office was 
17 William Davies to Governor Nelson, September 11, 1781, Ibid., 56-57. 
18 William Davies to Commissioners of Provision Law, August 14, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 
- September 1, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632,214.
19 William Davies to County Lieutenants, September 6, 1781, JWO, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 
633, 137. 
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able to provide substantial information, but by the admission of Colonel Davies it was not 
as much as he hoped. He apologized to the Speaker of the House that the returns 
are so imperfect I sincerely lament, but my repeated solicitations to the different 
officers and agents for the necessary papers have not proved effectual to procure 
them. I hope therefore the indulgence of the house will pardon the defective state 
in which the enclosed reports unavoidably appear. 20
The Commissioner of War made seven reports to the House and attempted to 
explain the problems with each return. In the first report on militia strength, Davies 
complained that the County Lieutenants sent inaccurate and incomplete forms. He 
summarized: 
In short so various were the modes adopted, that no certainty of information could 
be obtained from them, and government were almost as much instructed after 
receiving the returns as they were before. To alleviate this inconvenience a model 
was transmitted to each county for their observance but which I am sorry to say 
has been very little attended to. 21
Despite the inadequacies of the militia returns, Davies did believe that some 
useful information was present. For instance, in the report on the total strength of the 
state's militia he estimated that at least one-tenth of the state's militia were fit only for 
invalid duty. He was also able to point out that the number of militia officers were 
disproportionate to the number of militia effectives in many counties. In some counties 
that meant they had too many officers, and in others too few.22 In the second report about 
arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, Davies determined that the chief problem with the 
military stores was the militia's absconding with the public arms at an alarming rate. If 
20 William Davies to Speaker of the House of Delegates, December 15, 1781, WOLB November 
2, 1781 - January 22, 1781, microfilm reel 632, 118-125. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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the militia did not keep the public arms, then they damaged them during use, creating yet 
another problem. Davies explained "as matters are now arranged, all the state armories in 
our intervals of peace have been found unequal for the reparations of the injuries of the 
arms have received during the several invasions." The Commissioner of War 
recommended allowing the public, under certain regulations, to purchase the arms. He 
reasoned that if the militia owned the arms themselves they were more likely to take care 
ofthem.23
In the third report, Davies presented what returns he had of the state's recruits for 
the Continental Line. Once again, he lamented that the counties had paid little heed to 
keeping good records and transmitting them to the War Office. In fact, most of the 
information he did have seems to have been transmitted from the Continental officers. 
Because the counties had not used the descriptive forms he sent, he feared that many 
recruits, who had enlisted for the war in the counties, simply told the Continental officers 
at the general rendezvous that they had enlisted for eighteen months. Consequently, 
Virginia was denied proper credit for the bounties it had issued to the recruits. The 
Continental books would only give Virginia credit for the smaller bounty paid to eighteen 
months men instead of the larger bounty already advanced for an enlistment for the war. 24
In the fourth report, the Commissioner of War provided all of the information he 
had on the various militia delinquents from each county. Unfortunately, the inattention to 
the enforcement of the militia law, which required delinquents to be sentenced to six 
months of service, allowed many to escape unpunished. Davies even stated that 
23 lbid. 
24 Ibid. 
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numerous delinquents appeared to have enlisted in the volunteer legions to try to avoid 
their regular duty. The volunteer legions up to that point had not been called into 
• 25service.
In the fifth report, Colonel Davies reviewed the current state of the clothing law 
which required the counties to provide a certain amount of clothing for the Virginia 
troops. Many of the counties had not started to collect clothing and those counties that 
had could not give an accurate accounting. In many cases, Davies believed the clothing 
to be of poor quality and not necessarily the required type. The most worrisome trend 
noted in this return was many county commissioners' issuance of clothing without 
authorization from the state government. This, of course, would dramatically affect any 
plans the War Office had made to clothe the Virginia troops. Davies ended this report by 
reminding the House that "as the law now stands there is no prohibition to restrain the 
county lieutenants from issuing the clothing they receive nor is there a mode prescribed 
for the transportation or collection of it."26
In the sixth report, Colonel Davies provided all the information he had on the 
quantity of supplies the Commissioners of the Specifics Tax had collected and applied. 
Once again, he lamented that many of the commissioners went beyond their duties and 
issued the provisions without orders from government. The Commissioner of War 
predicted that unless laws were enacted, the specifics would continue to be misapplied, 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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and worse, the state would receive no credit from the Continent because the specifics 
were issued outside of proper channels. 27
In the last report to the Assembly, the War Office accounted for the wagons the 
state had collected for the use of the Continent. Davies reported some were turned away 
as insufficient, and those that were taken often were not given vouchers to make it a 
Continental charge. Another problem, the Commissioner of War mentioned, was that the 
law for providing wagons did not require their value to be ascertained. Consequently, the 
Commonwealth relied on the books of the Continental Quartermasters for their value. 
Davies pointed out that the wagons could be undervalued and Virginia would have no 
way of arguing the point. At the end of this last report, Colonel Davies concluded: 
It would have afforded some great satisfaction to have been able to have laid 
before the house the various other returns which by law are required from me. 
But the confusion and derangements which were occasioned by the rapid 
incursions of the enemy followed by the great and [ repeated] exertions required 
from every public department for the facilitating and support of the late operations 
below rendered it impractical to obtain the necessary information from the 
different officers. 28
While the War Office freely admitted that its information was incomplete, it was 
still effective in providing information to the government. Its inability to procure the 
correct information rests on the shoulders of others. The War Office Records show the 
diligence of Colonel Davies in asking for returns. The underlying problem is the 
autonomy of the County Lieutenants who seem not to recognize any responsibility to 
state government. In fact, the state government had no way to coerce local officials to do 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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their duty.29 The War Office relied on their good will to answer its calls for returns. In 
spite of this weakness, the War Office did provide logistical support to the government. 
While information gathering was a major problem for the War Office, it was not 
the only difficulty the Commissioner of War faced. The many different missions of his 
office meant that he dealt with other issues as well; the most important of which was the 
finances of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Money is a critical ingredient to waging a 
successful war, and the State Treasury was depleted. The economy was already burdened 
with debt from the French and Indian War. This meant that the current war would have 
to be funded largely on credit.30 The initial plan of the Assembly was to fund the war 
with paper money backed by the collection of future taxes. This failed because few taxes 
were collected and therefore the public credit rapidly declined. By 1779, the 
Commonwealth was forced to use commodity taxes to try to bolster the public credit.31
This, however, also proved ineffective in establishing the public credit on sound footing. 
When the War Office was created in 1780 the state's finances were in disrepair and paper 
money was depreciating rapidly. The value of the state's paper money depreciated from 
40 to 1 in 1780, to 150 to 1 in April of 1781 and finally to 800-1000 to 1 by September 
1781.32 This financial climate placed the War Office in the unenviable position of 
waging war with an empty war chest. The scarcity of funds affected the War Office in 
many ways. 
29 McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 310. 
30 Mary Travers Armentrout, "A Political Study of Virginia Finance 1781-1789," (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Virginia, 1934), 8-9. 
31 Ibid., 16-18. 
32 Ibid., 21-23. 
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One of the War Office's financial duties was to pay the salaries of the state troops 
and staff departments involved in supplying the army. The Journal of the War Office is 
filled with warrants issued by the Commissioner of War to the paymasters of the various 
corps of state and continental troops. For instance, on January 30, 1781, Colonel Muter 
issued a warrant in favor of Robert Boush, the paymaster for the State Garrison 
Regiment, for 78,244 pounds 6 pence. This amount compensated the regiment for the 
months of August through December and settled their account in new money at 40 to 1 
depreciation.33 The War Office was able to pay the troops in many cases, but that was 
not always true. After the invasions by the enemy had passed, supernumerary officers 
often applied for pay. The Commissioner of War, conscious of the state of the Treasury, 
issued instructions to the paymaster on how their pay should be administered. Since the 
Treasury could not afford to pay all of the supernumerary officers, Captain Windsor 
Browne was ordered to issue warrants to officers only if they had proper vouchers and 
proof of actual service in the invasion.34 Supernumerary officers were not the only ones 
to feel the effects of the budget crunch. The War Office reported to the executive that 
repeated applications for money were coming in from the officers of the Virginia 
Continental Line. Colonel Davies believed the reasons for so many requests to be the 
depreciation of money and the delay of their past payments. In fact, Davies reminded the 
Governor that the officers had not been paid in over a year and a half, except on 
account. 35 This exemplifies the problem the War Office faced. Because the Treasury 
33 Warrant to Robert Boush, January 30, 1781, JWO, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 17. 
34 William Davies to Captain Windsor Browne Paymaster, July l 0, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781 
- September I, 1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 115.
35 William Davies to Governor, July IO, 1781, Ibid.,87.
75 
lacked the funds, the War Office was forced to delay payments. When the situation of 
the officers became too grim, the Commissioner of War would allow officers to draw 
supplies on account in lieu of their pay. The regular troops, however, did not have this 
luxury and the irregularity of their pay clearly undermined morale and led to desertion. 
The financial situation not only affected the troops in service, but it also greatly 
impacted the state's ability to recruit new troops. The recruiting laws offered generous 
bounties for recruits that signed up for the service. The longer the recruit was willing to 
commit to service, the higher his bounty. The War Office was in charge of issuing the 
recruiting money to the various officers of the Virginia Continental Line. Two critical 
problems faced the War Office when dealing with recruiting. The first depended solely 
on the Treasury and the second on the recruiting officers themselves. In the first case, the 
issue was the amount of money government could afford to allocate to recruiting. This 
was out of the control of the War Office, but there appears to have been a small but 
steady flow of money from the Treasury. This was especially true during the Yorktown 
Campaign. The War Office issued 18 warrants for $3,100,000 in paper money between 
September and November 1781.36 Obviously, the prospect for victory over Cornwallis 
was a recruiter's dream and it seems like an outrageous sum of money until depreciation 
is calculated. At a rate of 1000 to 1, the princely sum of $3,100,000 is reduced to a mere 
$3,100. 
Once the War Office had the warrant for the recruiting money, the second 
problem became evident. Paper money was depreciating so quickly that the longer the 
War Office had the warrant, the less it was worth. Colonel Davies wasted no time in 
36 Warrants, September 5, 1781 to November 27, 1781, JWO, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 633, 136-
183. 
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calling the various recruiting officers to get their money. In a letter to Major Thomas 
Posey on September 4, 1781, Davies repeated his request for an officer to come get the 
warrant "because money is daily depreciating."37 On September 11, 1781, the 
Commissioner of War again wrote to Posey complaining that "if not put to use [the 
money] will depreciate into a worthless condition"38 Finally, Major Posey sent a 
Captain, who drew the warrant from the paymaster on September 20, 1781, to recruit for 
the regiment. 39
Most of the issues relating to recruiting were beyond the control of the War 
Office. The Commissioner of War could only issue what funds he received from the 
Treasury, which necessitated an urgent request for the proper officer to come take it. 
Aside from that, the War Office's only control over the finances of the recruiters was to 
admonish them to spend it frugally.40 The biggest concern for the recruits was the bounty 
itself. If it was in paper money, they refused to enlist, and if they had enlisted, they 
refused to march. Depreciation caused morale to plummet and led to desertions and 
mutiny.41 In 1782, recruiting became more difficult when the Assembly abolished paper 
money, but neglected to update the recruiting law. The recruiting law stipulated that the 
bounties were to be paid in paper money. The end result was few enlistments and some 
37 William Davies to Major Posey, September 4, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781-November 1, 
1781, WOR,L V, microfilm reel 632, 29. 
38 William Davies to Major Posey, September 11, 1781, Ibid., 57.
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40 William Davies to Colonel Febiger, August 27, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781-September 1, 
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very puzzled recruiting officers.42 The War Office was powerless to help and the
Treasury was bankrupt. 
Besides recruiting and paying the troops, the War Office was also responsible for 
the pay of the state staff departments. This included the Commissary of Hides and his 
tannery, the State Clothier and his factory at the Albemarle Barracks, the Quartermaster's 
Department and the Commissary of Military Stores, as well as the Commissary General 
of Purchases. Many examples of issued warrants exist in the Journal of the War Office. 
For instance, a warrant issued on July 20, 1781 for 9,698 pounds 10 shillings to pay the 
Commissary of Military Stores and his assistants.43 As expected, when the Treasury was 
low, these departments suffered a similar fate as the troops and officers of the line. 
The War Office was also responsible for the pay of the workmen in the factories 
and labs which made the supplies for the army. When the Treasury had the money, many 
warrants were issued to pay the men working in the factories and especially the foundry 
at Westham.44 Unfortunately, when the money in the Treasury ran low, the state's 
artificers and workmen suffered as much as the troops in the field. It was far more urgent 
to pay them, however, as many were not enlisted and therefore could abandon the public 
work. If the workmen in the public works stopped doing their jobs, the consequences 
could prove fatal to the troops in the field. By December 1781, the situation of the 
clothing factory at Albemarle Barracks was horrible. The workmen were unpaid and 
destitute for clothing themselves. The state was completely dependent on this factory to 
42 William Davies to Colonel Roe Cooper, March 23, 1782, WOLB January 22, 1782 - May 5, 
1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 65. 
43 Warrant to Captain Windsor Browne, July 20, 1781, JWO, WOR, LV microfilm reel 633, 96. 
44 Warrant to Phillip Moody, April 6, 1781, Ibid., 84. 
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clothe all of its troops. The Commissioner of War represented to the Governor that 
despite the emptiness of the Treasury, something had to be done or it would "ruin us."45 
The clothing factory at the Barracks was not the only public works to suffer from want of 
pay. Colonel Davies had to "acknowledge [the] embarrassing situation of the [gun] 
factory due to want of pay, depreciation of money, and the confusion due to the approach 
of the enemy." All Davies could do to help Charles Dick, the manager of the 
Fredericksburg gun factory, was to issue a certificate and offer the following advice. 
"Tell the men to wait awhile and not worry because [their] pay will match [the] 
depreciation."46 Without money, the War Office was powerless to pay the workmen, but 
there were other alternatives. 
The War Office did try to work around the finance problem by prevailing on the 
workmen to take late payments and in some cases finding an alternative to pay. In the 
case of the clothing factory, Davies asked for an order from the Governor to allow the 
Commissary of Stores to supply the workmen with articles of clothing to be deducted 
from their earned pay.47 If the War Office could not pay the workmen their salaries, it 
would at least try to pay them in kind. The Commissioner of War also recommended to 
the County Lieutenants that they should sell spoilable commodities collected as taxes to 
raise money to pay their wagon teams. He argued that punctual payments were 
45William Davies to Governor Harrison, December 8, 1781, WOLB November 2, 1781-January 
22, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 115-116. 
46 William Davies to Charles Dick, September 20, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781- November I, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 92-93. 
47 William Davies to Governor Harrison, December 8, 1781, WOLB November 2, 1781-January 
22, 1782, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 115-116. 
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impossible due to the state of the Treasury, and that if government began missing 
payments the public would lose even more faith in its credit.48
Colonel Davies expanded his efforts to get money to his factories by allowing 
various managers to take on private work to raise money for their departments. He gave 
orders to Captain James Anderson to "employ the public artificers in private works for 
money when there is no public business to be done."49 With money growing more and
more scarce, the Commissioner of War was forced to adopt another measure to get work 
done. Since he could not pay salaries with regularity, Colonel Davies turned to militia 
exemptions as his last option. It did not cost the state and that gave a potential artificer or 
workman an incentive to enlist. Davies was adamant men sign up for at least six months 
as an artificer in order to procure a militia exemption. In order for the exemption to be 
official, it had to be countersigned by the County Lieutenant and registered in the War 
Office. 5° Colonel Davies wanted to preserve the authority of the County Lieutenant over
his militia, but the need for labor at a cheap rate was of a higher priority. In circular 
letters to the County Lieutenants, the Commissioner of War explained that the 
Commissioners of the Specifics Tax "need aid and since [we] can't pay wages we must 
f� 1 . fr . ,,51 o 1er peop e exemptions om service.
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The War Office tried its best to keep the military factories of the state running, but 
the finances of the state became increasingly worse. In 1782, the General Assembly 
abolished paper money and embarked on a cost cutting scheme that devastated the ability 
of the War Office to meet its contracts. The War Office was ordered to trim the staff 
departments, reduce the number of state troops and not to advance any more supplies to 
the Continent except for the funds required by the Continental Congress. Colonel Davies 
was horrified for his prospects of supply when he realized that the "abolition of paper 
money' and the "slow business of taxes" would mean the Treasury would be "penniless 
until next fall."52 In a letter to the Commercial Agent, who purchased the materials for 
the factories, the Commissioner of War warned that it was better to buy clothing instead 
of cloth because there was no money to pay the artificers and he did not know if they 
would stay together. Colonel Davies ended the letter with "I hope you have funds for 
these articles, it is still my duty to inform you of the troops wants."53 The situation was 
so bad at the foundry that Colonel Davies implored the Governor to find some assistance 
for Captain Anderson. Evidently, his shops were unfinished because the state could not 
afford to buy any more siding and his workmen were idle because they lacked nail rod. 
To make matters worse, Capt Anderson threatened to resign because his family was 
starving since he had no money or supplies. 54
It seems that the shortage of money not only affected the pay of the artificers but 
also the ability of the state to buy materials for their factories. It was especially evident 
52 William Davies to Charles Dick, February 22, 1782, WOLB January 22, 1781 - May 5, 1782, 
WOR, L V, microfilm reel 632, 29-31. 
53 William Davies to Commercial Agent, February 26, 1782, Ibid., 33. 
54 William Davies to Governor Harrison, January 31, 1782, Ibid., 11-12. 
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in the repair of muskets. The militia damaged the public arms at such a rate that they 
could not be repaired quickly enough to ensure a constant supply.55 The lack of money 
compounded this problem because the War Office could not buy the materials needed to 
repair them or pay the various smiths. Colonel Davies was acutely aware of the problem 
and expressed it in a letter to Governor Benjamin Harrison: 
The State is in point of arms in a more defenseless situation at present then at any 
period prior to the capitulation of York; and how the grand object of repairing our 
arms can be accomplished while the heavy expense of maintaining the 
Continental Garrison at York and Hampton is thrown upon the State, I leave to 
your Excellency to judge. I know, sir, the censures which would be cast upon my 
conduct should the enemy visit us, and our arms be without repairs; and I am 
sensible the repairs of our arms cannot be effected for want of money ( and 
nothing else will do it) so long as the state is encumbered with the heavy expense 
of the troops below. 56
It is clear that the lack of money was placing the state in danger. Colonel Davies 
was just as afraid for the state as he was for his reputation. Davies, however, was 
resourceful and tried to come up with money to aid the factories. He suggested to the 
Governor that a few of the public houses that were empty in Richmond be rented out to 
raise money for the foundry. He also noted that the private Rope Walk in Richmond was 
hiring and the state had a few rope makers that might be hired out for a profit.57 Despite 
the War Office's best attempts it could not overcome the chronic shortage of funds. 
Finances remained the thorn in the side of the War Office's plans throughout the war. 
Even the War Office itself became a casualty to cost cutting as the prospects of peace 
improved toward the end of 1782. 
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Another issue facing the War Office was competition for the state's supplies and 
manpower. Virginia was the warehouse for the entire Southern Department of the 
Continental Army. Not only did the War Office supply the State Garrison Regiments, but 
it supplied the Continentals in Virginia as well as the Continental Army to the south. 
This meant that three different armies were vying for the same supplies and manpower. 
Naturally, conflicts arose and the War Office was left to sort them out. A good example 
occurred in December of 1780 when the state foundry was in need of nail rod. It also 
happened that the continental lab needed nail rod. The Commissioner of War realized 
this would create a bidding war for the nail rod and tried to prevent it. Colonel Muter 
ordered the state's Commissary of Stores to agree on a price with the Continental 
Commissary and then divide the nails.58 Manpower was also in demand by both the 
state and continent. Workmen quickly figured out they could play one off the other for 
better wages. The War Office fixed this problem by ordering the State Quarter Master to 
adopt the same wages per day as the Continental Quartermaster.59
The competition for manpower and supplies grew worse as the war progressed 
because of invasions and changes in policy. The Continental Congress complicated 
matters by adopting a policy of decentralization in its supply chain. The states were 
placed in departments which were assigned certain Continental Armies. Since Congress 
and the states were cash poor, they directed that the Continental Army be supplied 
through provision laws. Virginia had already adopted a provision law to provide supplies 
for its troops and the result was that both supply chains were effectively merged. 
58 George Muter to Armistead, December 11, 1780, WOLB July 21, 1780- January 2, 1781,
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Competition for supplies soon grew fierce as the weakness of the new policy was 
exposed. When the number of Continental troops in Virginia increased, the War Office 
was not able to call on other states to help supply them.60 The end result of the new 
policy was that confusion prevailed as to which stores were under the orders of the 
Continent and which were under those of Virginia. For instance, Colonel Muter tried to 
collect 200 state-owned cartouche boxes at Petersburg only to find that before his 
conductor arrived, Baron Steuben had sent them to the Continental Rendezvous at 
Chesterfield Courthouse.61 With the two supply systems effectively merged, the War 
Office's best laid plans were often obstructed by unauthorized seizures and orders of 
Continental officers. Colonel Davies, a stickler for the rules, was highly incensed by 
these derangements of his plans. In a letter to John Pryor, the State Commissary of 
Military Stores, Davies complained: 
Major Call honestly told me that he had sent to Potomack to seize the State 
accoutrements that were coming on from Philadelphia, Dr. Wilson said all our 
medicines that were on their way were seized by somebody and Mr. M Roberts, 
your deputy was taking measures to dispose of 2000 stand of arms that were 
coming in from the Northward; and all this without the consent or knowledge of 
the State and without a single voucher or receipt. If these things are tolerated, I 
will at once abandon a situation, where I am held responsible for derangements 
and losses that originate totally from the licentious interference of any individual 
that pleases. 62
The Commissioner of War was constantly frustrated when people broke in on his 
plans by assuming they had the authority to seize supplies. Colonel Davies wrote many 
letters trying to deter the various Continental Officers in the state from seizing supplies. 
60 Selby, Revolution, 263. 
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He admonished them not to supply their troops through unauthorized seizures because it 
ruined his calculations, could lead to fraud, and prevented the regular and complete 
supply of the Continental Line. 63 It seems many Continental Officers went to great
lengths to ensure their own supply over that of the state's. The Commissioner of War 
was livid when he found out that some state arms in a repair shop, along with the armory 
tools of the state, were branded with the Continental seal. It appears the Continental 
Commissary of Military Stores needed guns and his were damaged, so he seized the 
state's arms and by way of apology offered Colonel Davies his damaged ones. The 
Commissioner of War refused the damaged arms and demanded the state's arms back 
branded or not. 64 Perhaps the biggest Continental offender and thorn in the side of the 
War Office was General Weedon in Fredericksburg. 
General Weedon had retired from Continental service and was called on by the 
Governor of Virginia to lead militia during invasions. Unfortunately for the 
Commissioner of War, Weedon wanted to make sure his militia was expertly fitted out to 
the detriment of the entire state. On multiple occasions, Weedon took it upon himself to 
order the state's arms here and there without consulting the War Office. On August 31, 
1781, Davies told Captain Pryor, the Field Commissary of Military Stores, that it was 
rumored that Weedon had sent the arms meant for Fauquier County's militia to Orange 
County. The Commissioner of War's response to this news was, "I hope to God he has 
63 William Davies to Major Posey, September 14, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781 - November 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 623, 69. 
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1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 205-206. 
85 
not done so."65 That same day, Colonel Davies dispatched a letter to General Weedon 
addressing another of his misappropriations of state-owned stores. It seems Weedon had 
requested some cavalry stores in Winchester that the Commissioner of War had ordered 
from Philadelphia for the Continental Cavalry. Davies wrote: 
[It is] very unfortunate you sent to Winchester for Cavalry Equipment because [it] 
belongs to [the] state and are allotted to Major Call's Cavalry ... .I must beg a stop 
may be put to any distribution or appropriation of them, and that you will be kind 
enough to inform me where they are, that I may direct their destination according 
to the orders of government. 66
Weedon's actions were disrupting the plans of the War Office and the 
Commissioner of War was becoming increasingly agitated. Colonel Davies believed 
Weedon may even have been involved in the Continental theft and branding of the state 
arms. Weedon claimed he knew nothing about it, but Davies thought he was trying "to 
cover his interferences. "67 To make matters worse, Weedon provided a return of arms 
delivered to the Northern Neck that fell far short of the number the War Office had 
records of his receiving.68 The Commissioner of War eventually suggested prosecuting 
General Weedon over the arms he had seized. 69
Seizure and misapplication of stores were not the only problems caused by 
Continental interference. The Commissioner of War also had to deal with the confusion 
caused by orders for supplies. The War Office might order one thing and the Continental 
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Quartermaster another. This put the subordinates in the supply chain in a tough position. 
They were getting directions from too many leaders which resulted in waste. The chain 
of command was quickly splintered when the two supply chains were unofficially 
merged. A perfect example occurred in the summer of 1781. The Marquis de Lafayette 
was trying to out-run Lord Cornwallis in Virginia and urgently needed boats to cross 
rivers. Lafayette wrote to the War Office and others asking for help building boats. 
Colonel Davies began receiving complaints about the boats being built from several 
different officers. It led him to observe, "I have directed one thing, the Quartermaster 
another, the Commissaries a third, and the Marquis a fourth. With respect to the make of 
the boats there have been various opinions and everyone undertook to direct."70 The 
chain of command was blurring in Virginia and the result was confusion. 
Some officers attempted to take advantage of the confusion to get favorable 
orders. Colonel Davies had started to use militia exemptions to meet manpower needs in 
the Continental and State Quartermaster's Departments, but had issued strict rules on 
how and when men were to be exempted. Major Richard Claiborne, the Continental 
Quartermaster, applied to Davies for some exemptions, but did not like the War Office's 
directions concerning them. Instead of following the rules, Claiborne applied to 
Governor Nelson for the same exemptions. Claiborne was taking advantage of the fact 
that the Governor had been absent from Richmond and unaware ofDavies's exemption 
regulations.71 Continental interferences and the confusion that resulted made it harder 
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for the Commissioner of War to maintain the chain of command and regular supply lines. 
It was bad enough that the War Office dealt with competition and interference 
from the Continentals, but it also faced the same problems from the local County 
Officials. The County Lieutenants and local Commissioners of the Provision Laws were 
entrusted with a great deal of autonomy and more often than not abused this authority. 
The War Office used circular letters to try to communicate the orders of government to 
these officials. The distance from Richmond to some of these counties often meant that 
the County Lieutenants had to act on their own before instructions arrived. Many of the 
War Office's plans were ruined by County Lieutenants operating in ignorance of the 
wishes of government. Some County Lieutenants availed themselves of the public 
property to outfit their militia. This was especially true in the case of military stores. 
The Fairfax County Lieutenant seized the cartridge boxes meant for the State Garrison 
Regiment in September of 1781. Colonel Davies complained that now Colonel Dabney' s 
Regiment would have to march to Yorktown without them.72 In fact, Davies complained 
that various County Lieutenants were responsible for seizing over 1200 arms intended for 
the use of the regular state troops. 73 The seizure of arms was not the only infraction the 
County Lieutenants committed. The War Office was constantly forced to alter its plans 
because local officials had taken it upon themselves to issue provisions and clothes 
collected under law for the army. The County Lieutenant of Westmoreland issued the 
clothing his county had collected before Colonel Davies could have it forwarded to the 
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State Clothier.74 The War Office handled many other interferences and abuses of the 
County Lieutenants. When the state's budget crisis worsened in 1782, Colonel Davies 
complained to Governor Harrison that many of the County Commissioners refused to 
tum in the tax money they had collected. It seems they wanted to keep it on hand in case 
expenses arose. They also violated orders buy selling specifics for money and taking it as 
their pay, instead of the 10% of the specifics they were allowed. 75 This was a very
serious problem at the time because paper money had been abolished and the Treasury 
was virtually empty. The War Office needed the money badly to repair arms. 
Despite the problems with the Continentals and local officials, the War Office 
was able to take steps to limit their interference. The main weapon at the hands of the 
Commissioner of War was communication. He wrote frequent letters to officers and 
County Lieutenants with instructions not to issue any supplies unless by the order of the 
proper department head. The War Office's most successful campaign to establish 
regularity of issues was with clothing. Colonel Davies formulated a clothing plan for 
regular spring and winter issues with the help of John Peyton, the Clothier General for the 
State.76 With an iron will, Davies insisted on orders from the head of the Continental
Quartermaster's Department that "under no pretence should any of the articles be 
appropriated" without express orders from the War Office or Captain Peyton.77 The 
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Commissioner of War also went after the County Lieutenants instructing them that "any 
supplies received that are property of this state cannot be issued without orders from this 
office or the Department Head to whom they belong."78 Davies was quick to censure any 
County Lieutenant or Commissioner who overstepped his bounds and issued the clothing. 
The Commissioner of War insisted that the offender replace the clothing and demanded 
to know to whom it was issued. If the local official refused, Davies turned the matter 
over to the Attorney General to prosecute.79 In this manner, Colonel Davies was able to 
establish regularity in the clothing department and Captain Peyton, the Clothier General, 
with his tailors at the Albemarle Barracks were able to make regular issues to the various 
corps throughout the state. 
It appears from the War Office Records that the Commissioner of War was 
diligent in his efforts to establish regularity of issues and minimize confusion in the chain 
of command. However, the circumstances of war and Congress's policy of 
decentralization certainly handicapped his ability to do so. The independence oflocal 
officials and the interference of Continental officers also limited the effectiveness of the 
War Office. Despite these impediments, the War Office was able to keep supplies 
flowing to the Continental and State Regiments for which it was responsible. 
Absenteeism in the staff departments was another predicament the War Office 
had to handle. The staff departments of the state suffered a lot of turnover during the 
war. Many times the War Office was left to fill the breach. The Commissioner of War 
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normally did the duty himself until a proper officer could be found. The post of 
Commissary of Military Stores was constantly a problem in early 1781. The original 
appointee quit and his replacement, Captain Nathaniel Irish, was ordered to join his 
regiment in the Southern Continental Army. Colonel George Muter finally found a 
replacement for Irish on February 13, 1781.80 In the interim, Muter and the Deputy 
Quartermaster General, William Rose, were obliged to fulfill the duties normally 
associated with that department.81 When Colonel Davies was the Commissioner of the 
War Office, he had to assume the duties of the Commissary of Public Stores William 
Armistead. This was especially hard on the War Office because it diverted its attention 
from its proper duties. Colonel Davies complained to Governor Nelson that "Mr. 
Armistead's long absence has thrown his duties unfairly upon me."82 Unfortunately, both 
Commissioners of War were imposed upon by the Commissary of Provision John 
Browne. This officer of the state was so neglectful of his duties that even when he was 
present, nothing in his department got done. Major Robert Forsyth, the Deputy 
Commissary for Purchases of the Southern Continental Army, whose job it was to receive 
specifics from John Browne, complained to the War Office that despite repeated requests 
he could get no information from him.83 Colonel Davies answered Forsyth: 
You know my opinion of Browne and his management: I see daily less reason to 
hope an alteration for the better. Under his guidance there have been immense 
misapplications, wastes and irregular issues; that altho' there have been enormous 
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expenditures for the purposes of the continent, yet vouchers for them are so 
irregular and insufficient, that I fear they never will make the continent 
chargeable. 84 
It took Colonel Davies four months in office to get the Executive to order an enquiry into 
the conduct of Browne. Rather than submit to the enquiry, Browne resigned.85
An even bigger issue for the War Office was the absenteeism of the Governor. 
On several occasions, the Commissioner of War was left to fend for himself while the 
Governor and the Executive Council were away. During June of 1781, the state was left 
without a Governor for nine days while Cornwallis's troops ravaged the countryside all 
the way up to Charlottesville. Governor Jefferson's term had ended on the third of June 
and Cornwallis's army had forced the Virginia Government to retreat to Staunton. 
Colonel Davies was left to maintain the integrity of the war government until Governor 
Nelson was elected on the twelfth of June.86 While Jefferson had been a diligent 
Governor, he let others lead the troops in the field. Nelson, on the other hand, assumed 
control of the Virginia militia leaving the Executive Council and Colonel Davies to run 
the government. While the Governor was away at camp, Colonel Davies could direct the 
war effort as he saw fit. It was during the intervals of Nelson's absence from Richmond 
that Davies was able to hatch and enforce his militia exemption plan.87 Governor Nelson 
also suffered from an illness that kept him from his duties and rendered him 
incommunicado for weeks. Colonel Davies was forced to answer some of Nelson's 
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correspondence while the Governor was ill.88 Obviously, the absence of the Governor 
placed a hardship on the government, but in Nelson's case, Colonel Davies likely enjoyed 
it. He by no means abused his freedom to act. Whenever a piece of business came to the 
War Office that would normally require the attention of the Executive, Davies dutifully 
wrote to the correspondent that his business would have to wait until Nelson appeared or 
enough of the Executive Council was present. 89 The absence of the Governor did hinder 
the War Office, but in many ways, as with the militia exemption plan, it gave the 
Commissioner of War a free hand in implementing policy. 
Another problem the War Office faced was the invasion of the state by the 
British. Early in the war, Virginia was spared from invasion, but was compelled to 
replace two whole Continental armies. The first army was captured at Charleston in May 
1780 and the second was destroyed at Camden in August 1780. On the heels of these 
disasters came a major invasion of Virginia in October 1780. A British fleet carrying 
General Alexander Leslie and his troops arrived in the Chesapeake Bay and captured 
Portsmouth. This invasion marked the beginning of an entire year of enemy occupation 
for Virginia. Besides the occupation of Portsmouth, the British made three major raids 
into central Virginia reaching as far as Charlottesville. The first raid was Benedict 
Arnold's plundering of Richmond in January of 1781 and the second was General 
William Phillips drive to Petersburg in April of 1781. The third was Lord Cornwallis's 
juncture with Phillips in Petersburg. Cornwallis then drove through Richmond to 
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Charlottesville in June of 1781, before retreating to Yorktown in August. Aside from the 
obvious depredations of the enemy, these invasions posed a series of problems for the 
War Office. 
The chief evil of an invasion was the mobilization of the militia. This was 
expensive for the cash-depleted Commonwealth and led to a host of other problems. 
When the militia was mustered into service, it placed a tremendous burden on the state 
for supplies. The troops had to be fed on their way to the general rendezvous and in most 
cases armed. The militia was supposed to supply their own arms, but most were too poor 
to afford them. This placed the onus of arming them on the state, and, therefore, the War 
Office.90 The Commissioner of War had problems supplying the militia with arms for 
several reasons. The irregular distribution and seizure of arms often depleted the stock of 
state arms available for the militia.91 Also, a majority of the public arms were in disrepair 
from overuse by the militia and the War Office lacked the funds to get them repaired.92 
There were other problems related to militia mobilization as well. The Continental Draft 
was based on the militia system. When the militia mustered, the draft and recruitment of 
Continental soldiers stopped in those counties. Because Virginia was keeping one 
quarter of its militia in the field during 1781, the draft was never completed in many 
counties. The constant use of the militia put a huge strain on the resources of Virginia 
and disrupted recruiting for the Continental Army. 93 The delay of the draft coupled with 
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the depreciation of the bounty money crippled Continental recruiting in the counties. 
Since the militia was the backbone of defense in the Revolutionary War, the War Office 
was unable to correct any of the evils caused by its use. 
The Commissioner of War recognized the problems caused by militia and even 
suggested some measures to overcome them. In August 1781, Colonel Davies, fearful of 
the militia damaging the public arms while serving with Lafayette, proposed to appoint a 
Field Commissary of Military Stores. The Field Commissary's job would be to attend to 
the public arms in the militia's hands.94 Lafayette liked the idea and made a counter 
proposal to Colonel Davies, which advocated that any militia turning in bad arms be 
required to serve an extra fifteen days. 95 The Marquis allowed Davies to appoint John 
Pryor the new Field Commissary of Military Stores, but was frustrated in his attempts to 
get longer service for the militia. The appointment of a special officer to oversee the 
arms of the militia was only one ofDavies's ideas to fix the problem. In October of 
1781, Colonel Davies suggested that captured arms of the British might be sold to the 
public. He hoped that if the militia owned their own guns, they would take better care of 
them. Colonel Davies proposed that every man with $10,000 in taxable property be 
required to buy arms and accoutrements within six months, and men with $5,000 in 
taxable property would get a year to buy them. The guns would then be lodged with the 
County Lieutenant for the use of the local militia. Davies also proposed stiff penalties for 
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those who refused to purchase.96 His plan was not adopted, but it raised awareness of the
problem in the government. 
Another problem invasions caused the War Office was the dispersal of its stores 
and supplies. When an enemy incursion came through an area, all the military stores and 
provisions had to be moved. In the heat of the moment, many decisions were made by 
the men on the ground as to where the stores were sent. It was also standard practice not 
to gather all of the stores in a single place if it could be helped, as large quantities of 
stores would be targeted by the enemy. This dispersal of stores was problematic for the 
War Office because it was easy to lose track of which stores were sent where. The 
commanders in the field often did not have time to fill out the proper paperwork to notify 
the War Office. Colonel Davies often complained that "due to the late incursions many 
arms and accoutrements of the state have been dispersed in confusion."97 After Benedict
Arnold's sacking of Richmond, Governor Jefferson and Colonel Muter did not know 
where the public arms had been dispersed. Jefferson appealed to Colonel Davies, then 
the Continental commander at Chesterfield Court House, for their location. Colonel 
Davies's answer speaks volumes to the problem of dispersed stores: 
I am surprised your Excellency could conceive I should know where the military 
stores of this state were dispersed having had no kind of connexion [sic] with 
them, either in point of authority or information. I have, it is true, done 
everything to gain intelligence where they have been hid, and am endeavoring to 
get them together as well as I can. I was fearful, when I attempted to furnish the 
militia with the necessary equipments for the field, that I might be blamed by 
them for their very insufficient state, but I always thought I should stand acquitted 
before the Executive; who must, I think, by this time, be fully sensible that the 
former management of the military stores of this country was never adapted to the 
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defense of it. Should it, however, be desired I would not hesitate with the 
necessary tools to attempt to put the public arms into a condition, that would not 
again expose this country to such disgraces, as it has lately suffered.98 
The public arms were issued to militia and hidden away in so many places that 
Jefferson and Muter could get no account of them. When Colonel Davies was appointed 
Commissioner of the War in late March, the stores were still in a diffuse state from 
Arnold's raid on Richmond. He wrote to Governor Jefferson that the "scattered state of 
military stores [is] alarming."99 While Colonel Davies was more equal to the tasks of the 
War Office than George Muter, dispersal of stores and supplies remained a problem for 
the War Office while the enemy was in Virginia. 
Moveable goods and military stores could be dispersed quickly, but the state's 
military factories were not so easily moved. As a result of enemy incursions, most of the 
factories had to be relocated to the western part of the state. This was a hard lesson that 
the War Office learned in early 1781. The principle arms factory of the state was located 
seven miles above Richmond at Westham. Unfortunately, Richmond proved vulnerable 
to enemy attack when on January 5, 1781, Benedict Arnold's raid up the James River 
caught Virginia unprepared and resulted in a devastating blow to the state's military 
factories. Arnold's men ravaged the Westham foundry and destroyed the military stores 
they found. They burned the boring mill, magazine, ordinance shop, warehouses and the 
roof of the foundry. 100 Arnold's unopposed foray up the James reflected poorly on the
Jefferson administration. Not only was the foundry destroyed but many state records, 
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including the papers of the War Office, were lost. The Commissioner of War, George 
Muter, shouldered the blame for the losses, but it appears he may have been the patsy. 
Governor Jefferson should bear the majority of the blame, since he delayed ordering out 
the militia, and instead of using expresses to carry the dispatches, he allowed members of 
the Assembly to carry the letters back to their counties. This method proved to be too 
slow. 101 Thus, when Arnold arrived in Richmond, few militiamen opposed him. The
Commissioner of War cannot be blamed for the late orders, but he was not without blame 
for the disaster that was to follow. His culpability was exposed when he could not arm 
the militia that did arrive in Richmond. A few days earlier, Jefferson had ordered Muter 
to remove the military stores of the state to the south side of the James River. Muter 
could not arm the militia on the Richmond side of the river because he had already sent 
the arms across.102 This was a major mistake by the Commissioner of War, who knew
the ill-equipped militia would be called out. While it was necessary to remove the stores 
from Richmond as Arnold approached, the Commissioner of War should have anticipated 
that the militia would need some arms. As the full extent of the confusion and losses 
came to light, it was clear that the military resources of the state were not effectively 
organized. The inability to arm the militia caused the loss of the foundry and injured the 
ability of the state to supply its armed forces. It would cost Muter his job and 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the War Office under his direction. 
The War Office was faced with another task that would give it troubles 
throughout the war. The Commissioner of War, as head of the staff departments, was 
responsible for collecting the accounts of the departments so that Virginia could charge 
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the Continent for the expense of the war. The Continent was charged for any expenditure 
that occurred during invasion and in the process of providing the state's regular quota of 
supplies. The War Office Letter Books are full of letters from the Commissioner of War 
asking for accounts to be filed so that the Continent could be charged. 103 The quality of 
the returns received by the War Office helped determine how well accounts were settled 
by the auditors. The problems involved in information gathering definitely affected the 
War Office's ability to supply the auditors with good accounts. While this was a 
problem, it was not the most serious one. The larger issue the War Office faced was 
making sure the staff departments complied with the Continental Regulations for supply. 
The Continental Congress issued regulations on supply to provide a check on 
unwarranted expenses. The Continental Army kept accounts of what it received and the 
State kept accounts of what it issued. When the auditors settled, they tried to reconcile 
the two accounts. The Commissioner of War was faced with the problem of ensuring that 
the issues of the state were on the Continental Books. This, of course, depended on the 
Quartermasters and Commissaries in the field following the Continental and State 
guidelines for issuing and receiving supplies. Unfortunately, through incompetence and 
neglect of duty many state staff departments failed to issue the proper vouchers and keep 
good books. As the War Office tried to put these departments back in order, it 
encountered two significant problems. 
The first problem was that some state officials were also acting as their 
Continental counterparts. This meant that the same person was keeping both books. If 
that official was diligent and capable, it was still difficult at best to keep accurate books. 
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It appears this was the case for John Robertson, the State Commissary of Issues and the 
Deputy Commissary of Issues for the Continental Army. The Commissioner of War 
constantly chided Robertson about filing accounts with his superiors in the Continental 
service. He also warned Robertson about overlapping his posts because it was causing 
waste. 104 John Browne, the head of Virginia's Commissary Department, decided, 
without authorization, that he would act for the Continental Army in Virginia as well. 
This was an extraordinary occurrence because the properly-appointed Continental 
Officer, Major Robert Forsyth, could not get Browne to cooperate with him. In fact, 
Forsyth decided to leave Virginia rather than deal with Browne. This left the state 
without a proper officer to keep the Continental accounts. Browne acted for both 
departments, resulting in the state's being denied many of her credits on Continental 
accounts. 105
The War Office's second problem with keeping the State and Continental 
accounts balanced was the incompetence and negligence of some state officers. The 
worst offender was the Commissary, John Browne. His department was in shambles 
from the beginning of the War Office's tenure as the manager of the state's war machine. 
Browne elected not to follow the regulations of Congress and, of course, had assumed his 
Continental counterpart's duties. Colonel Davies addressed the problem in a letter to the 
Governor while making his case for the Commissary's dismissal. Colonel Davies wanted 
to "convince Government that we are pursuing a system totally wrong, a system very 
104 William Davies to John Robertson, June 26, 1781, WOLB January 18, 1781-September 1, 
1781, WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 109. 
105 William Davies to Marquis de Lafayette, August 19, 1781, Ibid., 191-193. 
100 
burthensome to the State, and liable to great dispute at settlement with Congress."106
Davies enclosed a copy of the Congressional Regulations and observed that Browne had 
"thrown this business" into an "entirely different channel" by taking it into his own 
hands. Upon consulting with Major Forsyth, Davies found that the credits Virginia had 
on the Continental Books did not amount to a "fiftieth part of what she had supplied."107
Browne's actions damaged the state and created a huge problem for the War Office. 
It is alarming that the previous Commissioner of War, George Muter, had not 
discovered Browne's actions. The War Office under Colonel Davies attempted to rectify 
the problem, but the injury to Virginia had already occurred. While examining the issue, 
Colonel Davies discovered that Virginia did not posses a current version of the 
Regulations of Congress. The only Congressional Regulations Virginia had received 
were those from December of 1780. 108 It seems that while the Virginia government
possessed the Congressional Journals of 1780, no one had extracted the necessary 
regulations. Colonel Davies asked Governor Nelson to let him appoint a person to comb 
the journals for the regulations pertaining to the various staff departments. He felt that 
armed with these regulations, the War Office could set matters straight in the staff 
departments. 109 
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The Commissioner of War issued many instructions to the staff departments to try 
to bring them into compliance with the Continental Army's regulations for supply. 
Colonel Davies informed John Robertson, the Commissary General of Issues, that he 
should only deliver his stores to the Quartermaster & Commissary General of Purchases' 
Departments. Ifhe issued to anyone else, the charges would not appear as a credit on the 
Continental Superintendent General of Finance's books.110 The Commissioner of War 
implored the staff departments and County Lieutenants to keep proper vouchers but 
realized that while the British were in Virginia, irregularities would continue. The 
Commissioner of War was conscious of the irregularities and decided that instructions 
alone would not stop irregular issues and accounts. Davies decided that the only way to 
get the State and Continental Departments to cooperate in bookkeeping was to call a 
conference. He proposed the idea to Major Richard Claiborne, the Deputy Quartermaster 
General of the Southern Department. Davies reiterated that a conference was needed that 
"we may form one uniform system for the future conduct of these departments."111 The 
Commissioner of War hoped that by fostering communication between the department 
heads the accounting issues could be solved. The conference, however, could not be held 
before the Virginia General Assembly intervened. Virginia's financial situation in 1782 
had convinced the Assembly to pass an act forbidding the advancement of supplies to the 
Continental Army unless specifically requested by Congress or the Financier.112 The
War Office ordered its departments to withhold supplies and refused to supply the 
110 William Davies to John Robertson, September 17, 1781, WOLB August 15, 1781-November 1, 
1781, WOR, L V, microfilm reel 632, 80-81. 
111 William Davies to Major Claiborne, October 13, 1781, Ibid., 145-147. 
112 William Davies to Captain Peyton, March 3, 1782, WOLB January 22, 1782-May 5, 1782, 
WOR, LV, microfilm reel 632, 40-41. 
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Continental Army unless the Financier sent a letter of credit. Colonel Davies was 
mortified because the troops in the field suffered from the law. The Commissioner of 
War wrote to General John P. G. Muhlenburg, who was overseeing the Continental 
Rendezvous for the new recruits, that Virginia would not supply him unless he could 
obtain a letter of credit from the Financier. Davies added that he had already written the 
Financier many times for a letter of credit but had not received an answer. 113
113 William Davies to General Muhlenburg, April 29, 1782, Ibid., 152. 
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CONCLUSION 
The War Office's ability to handle the problems that plagued it during the war 
determined its effectiveness. The critical component was the Commissioner of War. 
How this gentleman dealt with insurmountable issues decided the degree to which the 
problems were limited. The Commissioner of War could not be expected to eliminate the 
problems caused by lack of funds, enemy invasions, and the autonomy granted to local 
officials under the Virginia Constitution. He could, however, find ways to cope with 
these issues. The Commissioner of War could be expected to deal with chain of 
command issues, irregular seizures, absenteeism and neglect by state officers. The War 
Office under the direction of Colonel William Davies was able to combat these problems 
to a tolerable degree. Colonel George Muter's War Office, on the other hand, failed to 
find a way to manage these problems. 
In fact, the evidence points to the ineffectiveness of the War Office under Muter's 
command. The single greatest indictment of his tenure was the loss of the War Office 
Records during Arnold's Invasion. The primary function of the War Office was to 
provide strategic information on the state's ability to wage war, and Muter was careless 
with its records. The fragments ofMuter's War Office records show his efforts in 
attempting to complete his duties, but they also reveal his lack of proactive thinking. His 
mistake with the arms at Westham Foundry offers a perfect example. Muter should have 
realized the militia would require some arms. The fact that two months after Arnold's 
invasion the military stores and supplies were still in disarray also reflects poorly on the 
War Office. Muter's failure to investigate and discover John Browne's incompetence is 
another critical mistake. Browne was allowed to assume duties not properly assigned to 
him and poorly execute them. This reveals Muter's poor management of the War Office 
and clearly illustrates its ineffectiveness. Colonel Charles Harrison, in a letter to General 
Steuben on January 12, 1781, summed up the efficacy of the War Office: "Colonel 
Muter [was] still at [the] helm and in a perfect lethargy."1
Colonel Davies's War Office stands in stark contrast to that of George Muter. 
The War Office was effective at curtailing many of the problems that afflicted it. Colonel 
Davies's War Office overcame the issues of information gathering. He was able to 
produce a report to the General Assembly that was insightful and suggested many cures 
for the evils that plagued the state's war management. He handled the autonomy of the 
County Lieutenants by improving communications with them. Davies made it a point to 
constantly inform them of the desires of government. His circular letters are filled with 
instructions, prohibitions and advice to the County Lieutenants. Colonel Davies notified 
these men that the War Office was watching their conduct by requesting frequent returns, 
and he did not hesitate to rebuke them for irregularities. Colonel Davies's creative ideas 
allowed the War Office to cope with a lack of funds. While the problem was still 
chronic, Davies never gave up trying. He prevailed on troops to wait for payment and 
when that failed, offered to pay them with supplies. Davies instructed his factory 
managers to take on private work to earn money to buy supplies. He attempted to 
discover how to address the issues that affected him. In handling Continental 
interference and competition, Davies met the problem head on with the same tactics he 
applied to the County Lieutenants. He was watchful and quick to rebuke officers who 
strayed from regular channels. Colonel Davies fostered cooperation and better 
1 Charles Harrison to Steuben, January 12, 1781, in Palmer, Steuben, 249. 
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communication between the Continental Officers and the State Staff Departments. His 
attempts at establishing regularity in the accounts of both are to be lauded. Colonel 
Davies seized initiative and acted positively to affect change in the derangements of the 
state. His censure and ousting of John Browne represents a glaring example. Colonel 
Davies, unlike Muter, was a proactive thinker. His idea to appoint a Field Commissary of 
Military Stores to limit the damage the militia did to the public arms provides an 
excellent example. Davies was adaptable and little fazed by the fog of war. When the 
Governor was absent, he carried on with his duties and even seized the initiative to enact 
new policy. The move to militia exemptions instead of pay for workmen illustrates his 
command of the situation. Davies' s steady hand provided the continuity between the 
administrations of Governors Jefferson, Nelson and Harrison. 
The War Office was an effective part of Virginia's war time government when it 
had an able Commissioner. Muter's tenure adversely affected the defensibility of the 
state and caused the troops in the field untoward hardship. Davies's tenure restored the 
War Office to effectiveness and aided the troops in the field. The success of the 
Yorktown Campaign demonstrates the War Office's effectiveness. It was Davies's 
constant efforts to bring down supplies that allowed the French and American Armies to 
conduct a proper siege. The fact that so many supplies could be procured from the 
country after Cornwallis penetrated it all the way up to Charlottesville shows how able 
Davies was in handling the dispersal of supplies and the resulting confusion. John 
McBride was correct in his assertion that Davies deserves much of the credit given to 
Governor Nelson in the Yorktown Campaign.2
2 McBride, "Virginia War Effort," 328-329. 
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